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Abstract 
This paper explores the addition of arbitration into the Mutual Agreement Procedure of 
the OECD’s Model Double Tax Convention. Through a critical analysis of the provisions 
it determines that the arbitration clause does not uphold the core tenets of arbitration. The 
provisions is more akin to fact finding or an advisory opinion. It is suggested that this is 
an unsatisfactory state of affairs. The purpose of implementing the arbitration provision 
was to provide for effective and efficient dispute settlement—the result however, is vastly 
different. The provision is not completely condemned however. This paper suggests a 
number of improvements to the provision including binding arbitration, a waiver to further 
remedies and publication of arbitral awards. It is suggested that these improvements will 
facilitate effective and efficient dispute settlement and progress the OECD’s nascent 
proposal into a cornerstone of international tax disputes. 
 
Keywords: Double Tax Agreement, Mutual Agreement Procedure, Arbitration, OECD, 
Model Double Tax Convention    
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I Introduction 
Globalisation has led to a rise in cross-border trade and commerce. The collision between 
international transactions and national interest however, may impose the burden of double 
taxation on taxpayers as each state vies for its piece of the global tax pie.1 Double taxation 
can hamper economic activity and impede business confidence due to the misallocation of 
resources.2 Recognising the harm caused by double taxation, states have attempted to 
address the issue through the introduction of Double Tax Agreements (DTAs).3 These 
DTAs create a permissive allocation of each states tax rights. 
 
While states may agree to the form and wording of the DTA, their interpretations may 
differ. Foreshadowing these differences of interpretation and application most DTAs 
contain dispute resolution clauses. Traditionally these have provided for negotiation, 
between the two states party to the treaty, in order to seek an agreed position on taxation. 
A relatively recent introduction into the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development’s (OECD) Model Double Tax Convention (MDTC) is arbitration.4 
 
The latest MDTC provides that:5 
 
any unresolved issues arising from the case shall be submitted to arbitration if the 
[taxpayer] so requests. These unresolved issues shall not, however, be submitted to 
arbitration if a decision on these issues has already been rendered by a court or 
administrative tribunal of either State. Unless a [taxpayer] directly affected by the case 
does not accept the mutual agreement that implements the arbitration decision, that 
decision shall be binding on both Contracting States and shall be implemented 
notwithstanding any time limits in the domestic laws of these States. 
 
The aim of this paper is to assess the introduction of this arbitration provision for its 
effectiveness in resolving taxation disputes. In this endeavour this paper will focus on the 
  
1  Clinton Alley and others New Zealand Taxation 2008: Principles, Cases and Questions (Thomson 
Brookers, Wellington, 2008) at 669; and Allison Christians “How Nations Share” (2012) 87 Ind L 
J 1407 at 1408.  
2  Christians, above n 1, at 1414. 
3  Charles Irish “Private and Public Dispute Resolution in International Taxation” (2011) 4 Contemp 
Asia Arb J 121 at 132. 
4  OECD Articles of the Model Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital 2008; 
Richard Coombes “How to Get the Right Results through MAP” (2008) 19 ITR 15 at 17; Micah 
Burch, Luke Nottage and Brett Williams “Appropriate Treaty-Based Dispute Resolution for Asia-
Pacific Commerce in the 21st Century” (2012) 35 UNSWLJ 1013 at 1041. 
5  OECD Model Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital 2014, art 25(5). 
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MDTC as it is regarded as the template for the majority of DTAs in effect and heavily 
influences other model DTAs.6 
 
In Part II of this paper I will discuss the history, nature and proliferation of DTAs in 
international relations, including New Zealand’s experience with these agreements. In Part 
III I will discuss what happens when a taxpayer believes that they have not been taxed in 
accordance with the DTA and the traditional dispute resolution mechanism available—the 
Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP). In Part IV of this paper I will then assess the general 
nature of arbitration, before evaluating the arbitration provisions of the MDTC in Part V. 
This will provide a foundation for the critical assessment in Part VI of whether or not the 
arbitral procedure in the MDTC is really even arbitration. Finally in Part VII, I will suggest 
some ways to overcome the deficiencies that will be identified. These recommendations 
will form the basis of a sui generis arbitral regime that, while respecting the irreducible 
elements of arbitration, caters for the intricacies of competing sovereign claims and unique 
international tax concerns. 
 
II Double Tax Agreements 
International law provides no definition of the jurisdictional boundaries on the prerogative 
to collect tax.7 As such there may be overlapping exercises of jurisdiction (often on the 
equally permissible basis of source or residence taxation) to collect tax on the same 
income.8 To avoid this overlap tax rights were defined by a series of rudimentary soft law 
agreements between states. This agreement was facilitated by model treaties in 
international institutions like the OECD and the United Nations (UN).9 These model 
treaties, can be usefully described as soft law. Although they are capable of being 
incorporated in full by the adopting state there is no obligation to do so. Furthermore, 
although founded in consensus, these agreements do not impose a legal obligation on the 
state to respect the OECD or UN model.10 A state is free to reject international consensus 
  
6  Allison Christians “Networks, Norms, and National Tax Policy” (2010) 9 Wash U Global Stud L 
Rev 1 at 15; David Rosenbloom and others “The Unworldly World of Tax: A Proposal for an 
International Tax Cooperation Forum” (2014) 15 Fla Tax Rev 57 at 61; and Victor Thuronyi 
“International Tax Cooperation and a Multilateral Treaty” (2001) 26 Brook J Intl L 1641 at 1641. 
7  Alley and others, above n 1, at 669; Christians, above n 1, at 1414; and Sharon A Reece “Arbitration 
in Income Tax Treaties: To Be or Not to Be” (1992) 7 Fla J Intl L 277 at 277. 
8  Alley and others, above n 1, at 669. 
9  Christians, above n 1, at 1409. 
10  Allison Christians “Hard Law, Soft Law and International Taxation” (2008) 25 Wis Intl L J 325 at 
331. 
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and bargain for stronger positions with other states.11 These model treaties will however, 
form hard law once they form the basis of a DTA between states or are incorporated 
domestically so as to be enforceable.12 
 
A further benefit of DTAs is the possibility of greater enforcement of tax obligations.13 The 
common law default rule is that “no country enforces the revenue laws of another”.14 The 
rule against enforcement of foreign revenue law remains part of the contemporary law of 
Anglo-Commonwealth countries.15 The exercise of enforcement jurisdiction in tax matters 
is strictly territorially limited.16 DTAs can function to alleviate the obstruction of the rather 
strictly applied common law rule and allow for greater cooperation between states in the 
collection of taxes.17 The negotiation of DTAs provides both states with an opportunity to 
set the appropriate boundaries of cooperation and ensure reciprocity in revenue 
collection.18 Furthermore, DTAs ensure that revenue based policy remains in the control 
of the executive.19 
 
While there are many benefits to DTAs the road to the current MDTC has been a long one. 
This part of the paper will focus on the history, origins and acceptance of DTAs. An 
understanding of the importance of DTAs is essential when assessing the need for a 
structured dispute resolution process. 
 
  
11  Christians, above n 1, at 1450. 
12  Christians, above n 10, at 331. 
13  Alley and others, above n 1, at 667. 
14  Brokaw v Seatrain UK Ltd [1971] 2 QB 476 (CA) at 483 per Denning MR. 
15  Campbell McLachlan Foreign Relations Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014) at 
[11.91]. 
16  See for example: Holman v Johnson (1775) 1 Cowp 341, 343, 98 ER; Government of India v Taylor 
[1955] AC 491, (1955) 22 ILR 286 (HL); and United States of America v Harden [1963] SCR 366, 
(1963) 42 ILR 114. 
17  Avowal Administrative Attorneys Ltd v North Shore District Court [2008] 1 NZLR 675 at [21]; 
McLachlan, above n 15, at [11.93]–[11.99]; and OECD Model Convention with Respect to Taxes 
on Income and Capital 2014, art 27. 
18  McLachlan, above n 15, at [11.99]. 
19  McLachlan, above n 15, at [11.99]. 
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A History and Origins of DTAs 
Early agreements were initiated on an ad hoc basis—often when concerns were raised by 
one state as to the effect of foreign taxes on that state’s nationals.20 There was apprehension 
about the effect double taxation would have in building a strong economy and prosperous 
state. As early as the Bretton Woods agreement, which resulted in the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1945, the economic harm of tariffs was recognised.21 This 
same theory was applied to competing taxes. 
 
Historically there has been no explicit consensus as to the scope of a state’s right to tax. 
There has however, been general agreement that in order to facilitate economic growth 
taxes should be coordinated between states to ensure that they do not overlap. One of the 
earliest signs of agreement was the Washington Consensus. The Washington Consensus 
was a framework in which the US Government and international financial institutions 
based in the US, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, adopted 
several economic policies designed to support business and economic confidence.22 At the 
heart of this agreement was an emphasis on the importance of macroeconomic stability for 
the development of the global economy;23 including stabilising and potentially reforming 
tax policy.24 There were also general moves to increase each state’s tax base.25 The desire 
to increase the tax base had to develop in harmony with the overarching goal of economic 
development. As such there needed to be further agreement on which states can lay a claim 
to which income. 
 
A collection of international organisations have recognised this desire for international 
agreement.26 The OECD—in which membership includes states and interested groups such 
as business lobby groups and sector representatives—has been fundamental in the 
  
20  Andrew Smith “A History of New Zealand’s Double Tax Agreements” (2010) 16 New Zealand 
Journal of Taxation Law and Policy 105 at 107. 
21  Christians, above n 1, at 1412; and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 55 UNTS 188 (opened 
for signature 30 October 1947, entered into force 1 January 1948). 
22  Deepal Lal “Is the Washington Consensus Dead” (2012) 32 Cato J 493 at 494. 
23  John Williamson “A History of the Washington Consensus” (2009) 15 Law Bus Rev Am 7 at 8; and 
Joseph J Norton “Introduction: The Washington Consensus Redefined” (2009) 15 Law Bus Rev Am 
163 at 163. 
24  Lal, above n 22, at 494; and Williamson, above n 23, at 9. 
25  Williamson, above n 23, at 9. 
26  Christians, above n 1, at 1410. 
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development of soft law instruments in international tax law.27 The OECD’s MDTC is the 
primary template for DTAs worldwide.28  
 
1 Road to the OECD MDTC 
The origin of model tax treaties can be traced back to the League of Nations.29 The 
underlying rationale for drafting tax treaties was that agreement on taxing rights would 
facilitate further economic development.30 The League of Nations consultation process 
resulted in two major model tax treaties: the Mexico Model and the London Model.31 Each 
of these treaties represented the ideas of less developed and more developed nations 
respectively. The two documents were published by the League of Nations and were the 
primary guide for tax treaties until 1963.32  
 
The OECD’s first MDTC in 1963 was in essence that which was produced by the OECD’s 
predecessor, the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC).33 This 
document was the result of 15 Working Parties of the Fiscal Committee of the OEEC. The 
Working Parties were each made up of two states and each report back to a complete Fiscal 
Committee.34 While these working parties did not have input from outside groups like the 
OECD enjoys today (for example business groups and sector representatives) the Fiscal 
Committee was initiated at the urging of the International Chamber of Commerce—the 
representative body of the worldwide business community.35 
 
  
27  Richard Hammer and Jeffrey Owens “OECD Promoting Tax Competition” (2001) 12 Intl Tax Rev 
45 at 45. 
28  Christians, above n 6, at 15; Rosenbloom and others, above n 6, at 61; Thuronyi, above n 6, at 1641; 
and Burch, Nottage and Williams, above n 4 at 1039. 
29  John Avery Jones “Understanding the OECD Model Tax Convention: The Lesson of History” 
(2009) 10 Fla Tax Rev 1 at 3; Donald Whittaker “An Examination of the OECD and UN Model Tax 
Treaties: History, Provisions and Application to US. Foreign Policy” (1983) 8 N C J Intl L & Com 
Reg 39; and Michelle Bertolini and Pamela Weaver “Mandatory Arbitration within Tax Treaties: A 
Need for a Coherent International Standard” (2013) 11(2) ATA Journal of Legal Tax Research 1 at 
3.  
30  Whittaker, above n 29, at 43; and Gustaf Lindencrona “How to resolve International Tax Disputes? 
New Approaches to an Old Problem” (1990) 5 Intertax 266. 
31  Whittaker, above n 29, at 43. 
32  Whittaker, above n 29, at 44. 
33  Jones, above n 29, at 3. 
34  Jones, above n 29, at 4. 
35  Lindencrona, above n 30, at 272. 
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The latest MDTC was released in 2014.36 Further consultation for amendment is ongoing 
under the Base Erosion and Profiting Shifting project.37 The way in which the OECD 
finalises the MDTC is of particular importance as it can influence the final result. The 
aggregate of opinion and preference exposed through negotiations and discussion of the 
members, in the most part, determines the scope and content of international tax law.38 
When considering the most recent amendments it is important to consider those who are 
now influencing the development of the MDTC. When the first MDTC was released it was 
a product of negotiation between states only. The current makeup of the OECD includes 
stakeholders such as the Business Industry and Trade Union Advisory Committees.39 These 
groups represent interests which are often different to those of the states. Therefore much 
more development has been seen recently on what would be called a ‘pro business’ level. 
Indeed, the ICC has been pushing for different amendments to the OECD MDTC for some 
time including the incorporation of arbitration provisions.40 
 
2 Early dispute resolution provisions—a forerunner to MAP 
A common thread in all model tax treaties has been a commitment from states to taxpayers 
that taxpayers would have the right to petition states to resolve double taxation. This was 
difficult for some states to accept and in some instances states did not conclude treaties for 
fear that challenges to their right to tax would be questioning their sovereignty.41 This 
taxpayer petition generally took the form of a request triggering negotiations between the 
two states party to the DTA. Some commentators have indicated that early dispute 
resolution articles were not well considered. In early model treaties it was never thought 
necessary for a supranational body to decide interpretation issues, due to the relatively 
insignificant extent to which tax treaties were operating in the early stages.42 
 
  
36  OECD Model Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital 2014. 
37  See for example Jasmin Kollmann and others “Arbitration in International Tax Matters” (March 
2015) Tax Notes International; and OECD BEPS Action 14: Make Dispute Resolution Mechanisms 
More Effective (Public Discussion Draft, December 2014). 
38  Burch, Nottage and Williams, above n 4, at 1039. See also “Decision Making in the OECD” below 
at page 22. 
39  OECD “Members and Partners” <www.oecd.org>. 
40  International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration in International Tax Matters (Policy Statement, 3 
May 2000) at 1. 
41  See the dissolution of the multilateral agreement between Italy, Hungry, Poland Romania and 
Yugoslavia in 1922; and Bertolini and Weaver, above n 29, at 3. 
42  Lindencrona, above n 30, at 266. 
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That being said, some bilateral treaties did specifically consider the best way to resolve 
interpretation issues. Arbitration was, for a period, used significantly and in a 
complementary fashion to negotiation between the contracting states.43 The proliferation 
of tax treaties soon changed this however. The main dispute mechanism became one which 
authorised the states to negotiate with each other and agree on the correct interpretation of 
the particular tax treaty in the case of the particular taxpayer. These negotiation practices 
eventuality crystallised into a set of rules which gradually became the norm in subsequent 
treaties.44 This negotiation procedure was outlined in the OECD’s first MDTC in 1963 as 
the MAP procedure.  
 
3 International acceptance of DTAs 
While there may be a general acceptance of DTAs, the resolution of double taxation does 
not necessarily require international cooperation. States may offer unilateral solutions to 
the problem of double taxation.45 This may be through a tax exemption or by providing a 
credit against domestic taxes. While these solutions may eliminate the double taxation 
incurred by the taxpayer they may also be detrimental to the revenue base of the state 
granting the unilateral relief.  
 
These unilateral approaches may also increase the instances of states “gaming” each other. 
Gaming may happen when one state offers a tax exception for its tax residents working in 
foreign state. The foreign state will increase the tax rates on the foreign tax resident to 
increase its tax revenue. For example, a New Zealand tax resident travels to Australia to 
work. As a result of the combination of source and residence taxation the taxpayer may be 
liable to pay tax in both countries. Because of this, New Zealand may grant a credit for the 
tax paid in Australia against New Zealand tax payable on that income. In theory Australia 
could ‘game’ New Zealand’s foreign tax credit rules by increasing its tax on the New 
Zealand resident up to the amount of the New Zealand tax credit. Australia’s doing so 
would create a wealth transfer straight from New Zealand to Australia; in essence 
increasing the tax revenue and base of Australia at the expense of New Zealand. 
 
A further ancillary effect is that a taxpayer may gain a perceived windfall and in some 
cases, may end up paying no tax at all. For example, if New Zealand provides a tax 
exemption to a New Zealand resident taxpayer on income earned in Germany, yet Germany 
  
43  Lindencrona, above n 30, at 267. 
44  Lindencrona, above n 30, at 267. 
45  Christians, above n 1, at 1417. 
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also provides an exemption from income tax for non-residents, the taxpayer effectively 
pays no tax on the income earned in Germany, as both states are giving tax exemptions. 
Because of these difficulties in policing accurate and workable unilateral solutions, 
cooperation between states has become a preferred option for dealing with issues of double 
taxation.46  
 
DTAs are bilateral agreements in which the states agree to the taxation and exemptions that 
will apply to taxpayers in their respective jurisdictions.47 The main function of these treaties 
is to allocate the right to tax between the states. Taxpayers are generally provided with the 
right to challenge tax authorities’ interpretations of these agreements and their resulting tax 
practices, if they are not in accordance with the agreements. The hope is that these 
agreements provide each state its fair share of the tax revenue from opening its borders and 
facilitating the movement of goods, services and skills in the economy.48 
 
4 New Zealand’s experience with DTAs 
New Zealand’s early income tax system was inherited from the United Kingdom and was 
a territorial income tax—i.e. tax was imposed on New Zealand sourced income only.49 As 
a result income earned in other jurisdictions was of little consequence to the tax authorities 
of the time and New Zealand tax residents were not often troubled by double taxation.50 It 
was not until 1916 that New Zealand moved to a system of worldwide taxation of residents. 
This system, at times, resulted in an effective tax rate of over 100 per cent.51 The only 
exception to this worldwide tax was the Dominion Tax exception. This provided that 
income earned in another jurisdiction within the British Empire, and taxed in that 
jurisdiction, was exempt from New Zealand tax.52 This was an intra-imperial agreement 
and as such no tax treaty was concluded.53 
 
  
46  Christians, above n 1, at 1419. 
47  Allison Christians “Your Own Personal Tax Law, Dispute Resolution under the OECD Model Tax 
Convention” (2009) 17 Willamette J Intl L Dis Res 172 at 173. 
48  Christians, above n 1, at 1412; and Gerrit Groen “Arbitration in Bilateral Tax Treaties” (2002) 30 
Intertax 3.  
49  Alley and others, above n 1, at 34; and Smith, above n 20, at 106. 
50  Smith, above n 20, at 106. 
51  Smith, above n 20, at 106. 
52  Land and Income Tax Act 1916, s 92. 
53  Peter Harris “A Historic View of the Principle and Options for Double Tax Relief” (1999) 6 BTR 
469 at 476. 
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As a result of New Zealand’s status as a capital importing economy the tax laws often 
differed from those of major trading partners in Europe—who were often capital exporting 
economies.54 This would often result in less favourable tax obligations for companies, and 
indeed individuals, of New Zealand’s major trading partners. As a result of opposition from 
foreign states to New Zealand’s taxation scheme, the Land and Income Tax Amendment 
Act 1935 was passed. This provided the Governor-General in Council with the ability to 
exempt the profits of non-resident traders from New Zealand tax if the Governor-General 
was satisfied that New Zealand residents were similarly exempt in the traders home state.55 
This relief was not conditional on a negotiation between New Zealand and its trading 
partner or on a treaty being signed. In the years from 1936–1946, seven such exemptions 
were promulgated.56 While these arrangements were extraordinarily limited when 
compared with the New Zealand’s modern DTAs, they exemplify the importance placed 
on relieving double tax. 
 
Since the end of the Second World War New Zealand has accepted the utility of wider 
ranging DTAs. Early DTAs were concluded with the United Kingdom and the US.57 After 
the Gibbs Committee—which was a committee established to provide guidance on the 
introduction of a new taxation scheme to increase economic growth—released its final 
report, it was clear that international double taxation was still a serious problem to New 
Zealand’s status as a preferred trading partner.58 As a capital importing country however, 
New Zealand remained reluctant to relinquish its tax base. After its accession to the OECD 
in 1973, New Zealand has had to reconsider its position.  
 
The primary objective for New Zealand entering into DTAs is to “provide relief from 
inevitable double taxation”.59 Generally all DTAs to which New Zealand is a party provides 
relief in three ways:60 a) by allocating tax rights to one of the two contracting states, b) by 
limiting the amount of tax that the source country can impose, or c) by requiring the 
taxpayer’s resident state to provide a tax credit on any foreign tax paid. 
 
  
54  Smith, above n 20, at 107. 
55  Land Income Tax Amendment Act 1935, s 11. 
56  Those were: Belgium, Switzerland, Indonesia, Japan, Czecholovakia, the United Kingdom and 
Canada. See Smith, above n 20, at 107. 
57  Smith, above n 20, at 108. 
58  Smith, above n 20, at 110. 
59  Alley and others, above n 1, at 669. 
60  Alley and others, above n 1, at 669. 
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Since New Zealand’s accession to the OECD the number of DTAs in which New Zealand 
is party has grown considerably. New Zealand currently has 39 DTAs with various trading 
partners with further DTAs under negotiation.61 New Zealand continues to use the MDTC 
as a model for all of its DTAs.62  
 
III Taxation not in Accordance with the DTA 
The DTAs function as a framework for the correct allocation of taxing rights for each state 
party to the economic activity at issue. While the parties will agree on the form of the DTA, 
the interpretation may not always align. Disputes may arise when there is disagreement as 
to the interpretation or the characterisation of income. Take the situation of a New Zealand 
tax resident who goes to the US to produce and record music for an album and earns 
$10,000 for doing so. The taxpayer might declare this as income for services provided to 
the music industry and it is therefore taxable only in New Zealand.63 The US however, 
might not assess this as income for services provided to the music industry but rather as 
royalties and demand the appropriate payment of tax in the US.64 This illustrates that while 
the two states may be able to come to an agreement as to the way in which certain income 
is to be taxed, they may not be able to agree on the classification of certain income streams. 
 
While in many cases there are attempts to define what is meant by the different types of 
income streams,65 disputes are inevitable.66 If a taxpayer considers that they have not been 
taxed in accordance with the DTA they may present their case, within three years of first 
notification of the taxation, to the competent authority of the contracting state of which the 
taxpayer is resident.67 If this matter cannot be resolved unilaterally (i.e. by the resident state 
forgoing its claim to the tax revenue) it must be elevated to MAP.68 
 
  
61  See Inland Revenue Department “Tax Treaties” Tax Policies <www.ird.govt.nz>. At the time of 
writing a DTA with Samoa had been signed but is yet to enter into force. 
62  Chatfield & Co Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2015] NZHC 2099 at [7]. 
63  Double Taxation Relief (United States of America) Order 1983, sch 1, art 17. 
64  Double Taxation Relief (United States of America) Order, sch 2, art VIII(2).  
65  See the definitions in the OECD Model Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital 
2014. 
66  William W Park “Income Tax Treaty Arbitration” (2002) 10 Geo Mason L Rec 803; Coombes, 
above n 4, at 15; and Eduard Sporken and Kelly Bouman “Dutch Introduce Welcome Changes to 
MAP” (2008) 19 Intl Tax Rev 18. 
67  OECD Model Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital 2014, art 25(1). 
68  OECD Model Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital 2014, art 25(1). 
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A Mutual Agreement Procedure 
The most common way of dealing with disputes in DTAs is through MAP.69 If a taxpayer 
considers that they have been subject to taxation that is not in accordance with the DTA, 
the taxpayer can petition a designated official in their resident state, termed a component 
authority, for relief.70 If the competent authority decides that the complaint has merit, and 
cannot be resolved unilaterally,71 then they must present the matter to their foreign 
counterpart to engage in negotiations and attempt to resolve the double taxation.72 The two 
component authorities then have a duty to “endeavour” to resolve the situation through the 
MAP process.73  
 
The MDTC gives the competent authorities the ability to conclude MAP cases that can 
“reasonably be considered to remain within the scope of the tax treaty provision”.74 It may 
therefore seem unlikely that the competent authorities would have the ability to settle a 
MAP case which avoided double taxation but was in contradiction to the strict application 
of the DTA. The OECD has attempted to find a solution to this potentially unsatisfactory 
restriction however. Where the articles of the DTA are preventing an agreement the 
competent authorities may “have regard to equity in order to give the taxpayer 
satisfaction.”75 A taxpayer may therefore be subject to taxation that is not in accordance 
with the DTA but is a satisfactory resolution for the taxpayer. 
 
MAP is designed to absolve the taxpayer of the need to go through litigation or to petition 
the tax authorities in both states to ensure taxation in accordance with the DTA.76 It is 
designed to be a process which facilitates fast and effective resolutions to interpretation 
  
69  Coombes, above n 4, at 15; Sporken and Bouman, above n 66, at 18; and Groen, above n 48, at 4. 
70  In most states the competent authority is an official within the internal tax authority. In New Zealand 
the competent authority is the Commissioner of the Inland Revenue Department or their nominated 
representative. The nominated representative at the time of writing was John Nash, Manager 
(International Revenue Strategy). 
71  OECD Model Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital 2014, art 25(2). 
72  Groen, above n 48, at 4. 
73  OECD Model Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital 2014, art 25(2); Burch, 
Luke and Williams, above n 4, at 1040; Micah Burch and Luke Nottage “Novel Treaty-Based 
Approaches to Resolving International Investment and Tax Disputes in the Asia-Pacific Region” 
(2011) 18 Austl Intl L J 127 at 134; Christians, above n 47, at 172; Groen, above n 48, at 5; OECD 
Model Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital 2014, art 25(3); and see Appendix 
One. 
74  Groen, above n 48, at 5 (emphasis omitted). 
75  OECD “Commentaries on the Articles of the Model Tax Convention” article 25 at [38]. 
76  OECD “Commentaries on the Articles of the Model Tax Convention” article 25 at [7]. 
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disputes between the two contracting states.77  MAP negotiation, in most cases, does not 
deprive the taxpayer of the right to litigate in domestic courts,78 but it is often a preferred 
remedy because of the cost of litigation. If the two competent authorities can reach a 
mutually agreeably interpretation of the treaty there should, in theory, be movements by 
both or just one of the tax authorities to ensure that a taxpayer only pays tax in accordance 
with the DTA.79 If however, the two competent authorities cannot come to an agreement, 
litigation may be the only available option to taxpayers to avoid double taxation.80 
Fundamentally, MAP is a negotiation between the two states to agree on the tax take in any 
particular situation.81 The process however, has not escaped criticism. With the under 
resourcing of MAP cases and the exclusion of potentially valuable input from the taxpayer, 
many shortcomings in the MAP procedure have been identified. 
 
B Concerns with MAP 
MAP has been described as “old fashioned and slow” when dealing with complaints from 
taxpayers.82 While this may not be an entirely fair assessment of the process itself, as some 
of the concerns can be attributed to the state parties negotiating the dispute, there are some 
clear issues with MAP as a dispute resolution mechanism in international tax law. 
 
1 Delays 
The reluctance of competent authorities to depart from their own domestic rules regarding 
tax obligations can cause a stalemate in some situations, leaving the taxpayer with no 
relief.83 While it may not yet be a significant problem in New Zealand,84 larger states are 
facing a substantial backlog of MAP cases.85 In 2013 alone, there were over 1910 new 
claims in OECD member states and 4566 unresolved MAP cases.86 The number of MAP 
cases combined with the average length of time to resolve the disputes (23.2 months in 
  
77  See generally OECD “Commentaries on the Articles of the Model Tax Convention” article 25. 
78  OECD “Commentaries on the Articles of the Model Tax Convention” article 25 at [7]. 
79  Coombes, above n 4, at 15. 
80  Sporken and Bouman, above n 66, at 19. 
81  Sporken and Bouman, above n 66, at 18. 
82  Coombes, above n 4, at 17. 
83  Coombes, above n 4, at 17. 
84  Only 42 requests for MAP have been received by the New Zealand Competent Authority from 2006–
2013, see OECD “Mutual Agreement Procedure Statistics for 2013” <www.oecd.org>. 
85  Burch, Luke and Williams, above n 4, at 1040; Christians, above n 47, at 178; and Joe Dalton 
“Unlocking MAP Disputes: Is Mediation the Key?” (2013) 24 Intl Tax Rev 14 at 15. 
86  OECD “Mutual Agreement Procedure Statistics for 2013” <www.oecd.org>. 
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2013) presents a significant problem for taxpayers.87 One reason for the delay is the 
increased use of MAP as a dispute resolution tool. There are only limited resources to 
finance and facilitate the MAP process. Each new case adds an extra burden onto already 
limited resources. Furthermore, there is an increase in the number of states who are 
beginning to engage in the MAP process, often from less developed areas which can cause 
significant delays. 
 
States without experience in the MAP process, or highly technical tax issues such as 
transfer pricing, are naturally slower at resolving cases. This has flow on effects for the 
other contracting state and their backlog of cases.88 This can have wider ramifications than 
just the MAP procedure. Oftentimes relationships between competent authorities have been 
considerably strained because of the time it takes to resolve some cases. 89 This may affect 
future working relationships and opportunities to agree in advance to certain cases to help 
avoid further MAP cases, such as the creation of advance pricing agreements. 
 
The MAP process should be fast and efficient at resolving disputes. One of the main 
reasons for the accumulation of unresolved MAP cases is that the competent authorities 
must only “endeavour” to reach a resolution.90 There is neither an obligation nor any 
sanction for failing to resolve a particular case.91 Through MAP negotiations alone it is 
possible that disputes will remain unresolved and taxpayers will suffer double taxation, 
contrary to the very purpose of the DTA.92 There is often little or no motivation for 
competent authorities to expedite the process.93 While this does not leave the taxpayer 
without further remedy, as they still have recourse to domestic courts,94 it does put them in 
a precarious position. Considerable resources must be expended to receive a judgment and 
  
87  Dalton, above n 85, at 15. 
88  Dalton, above n 85, at 15. 
89  Dalton, above n 85, at 15. 
90  OECD Model Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital 2014, art 25(2); Burch, 
Luke and Williams, above n 4, at 1040; Burch and Nottage, above n 73, at 134; and Christians, 
above n 47, at 172. 
91  Lindencrona, above n 30, at 266; Guillermo Campos “Treaty Provision for the Arbitration of 
Transfer Pricing Disputes” (1996) 10 Intertax 370 at 371; Park, above n 66, at 809; and Christians, 
above n 47, at 180. 
92  Campos, above n 91, at 371. 
93  Michelle Markham “The Resolution of Transfer Pricing Disputes Through Arbitration” (2005) 33 
Intertax 68; and Park, above n 66, at 809. 
94  OECD “Commentaries on the Articles of the Model Tax Convention” article 25 at [7]. 
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there is no guarantee that this would not be appealed by the state if an adverse ruling was 
delivered.95  
 
2 No taxpayer involvement 
Furthermore, there is no direct taxpayer involvement in the MAP negotiations and the 
taxpayer does not have an automatic right to submit their case, or interpretation of the 
treaty, to the competent authorities.96  
 
While the theoretical basis may be that the taxpayer does not concern themselves with who 
gets the right to tax their income, so long as the double taxation is resolved, this does not 
hold weight after further investigation.97 The two states may be claiming competing 
classifications of income which may attract varying tax rates. Furthermore, the DTA 
creates a permissive regime not a prescriptive one. The state has a right to tax not an 
obligation to tax. All three parties (the two states and the taxpayer) have unique and often 
competing interests in the resolution of the dispute.98 
 
While the taxpayer may be asked to provide extra information, MAP remains a “strictly 
intra-governmental” process.99 While it is in the best interests of the taxpayer to provide as 
much information as requested by the competent authorities, taxpayers may be weary of 
this as it may amount to what some have called a “joint audit” on the taxpayer.100 This 
unsatisfactory situation has led taxpayers, especially large taxpayers, to lobby for a more 
effective dispute resolution mechanism.101 
 
3 Lack of guidance from previous MAP cases 
The taxpayer’s claim may also be subject to intergovernmental “horse trading … [as 
competent authorities] might be tempted to sacrifice a taxpayer in one dispute as a 
bargaining chip in another case”.102 The opportunities for the taxpayer to exert influence 
  
95  Campos, above n 91, at 371. 
96  Coombes, above n 4, at 15. 
97  Richard Caves Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis (3rd ed, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2007) at 223.  
98  Christians, above n 1, at 1423. 
99  Coombes, above n 4, at 15; and Christians, above n 1, at 1424. 
100  Burch, Luke and Williams, above n 4, at 1040. 
101  Burch, Luke and Williams, above n 4, at 1040. 
102  Park, above n 66, at 804; and Burch, Luke and Williams, above n 4, at 1040. 
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on the MAP are relatively few in an often highly confidential process between the two 
states.103 The number of cases that are decided though MAP represents a potentially 
significant amount of tax law that is being decided by the competent authorities of each 
state in private negotiations without input from those affected.104 This is particularly 
troubling as the decisions that are made in one MAP do not apply to other like cases, nor 
do they necessarily influence the competent authorities in future MAP negotiations.105  
 
Negotiations and other decisions that deviate from the internal regulatory regime create a 
deficiency in knowledge for taxpayers. They are deprived of critical information to make 
a planned and educated assessment of the tax system as a whole and the tax burden that 
will likely be imposed.106 States may want to continue to bargain for stronger positions, 
irrespective of what has previously been decided, thus drawing out the process.107 
 
 
C Domestic Enforceability of DTAs 
As previously alluded to the MAP process is not the only remedy available to a taxpayer. 
DTAs also form a part of domestic legislation and are therefore subject to the jurisdiction 
of the domestic court.108 New Zealand follows many other jurisdictions in providing that 
the DTA will take precedence over domestic legislation detailing tax obligations.109 So if 
a conflict arises between the Income Tax Act 2007 and the DTA the provisions of the DTA 
will prevail. The taxpayer must be careful about choosing to pursue domestic remedies 
however, as they may have an effect on whether the taxpayer can then progress to MAP or 
arbitration.110 
 
The MAP process falls short of what is required for an effective dispute resolution 
mechanism.111 It is “rooted in antiquated principles of international law” that holds that 
states are the sole subjects.112 As such, the taxpayer has no right to be involved in the 
  
103  Burch, Luke and Williams, above n 4, at 1040; and Coombes, above n 4, at 17. 
104  Christians, above n 47, at 178. 
105  Groen, above n 48, at 7. 
106  Christians, above n 1, at 1409. 
107  Campos, above n 91, at 373. 
108  See for example New Zealand Orders in Council incorporating DTAs into New Zealand. 
109  Income Tax Act 2007, s BH1(4). 
110  See discussion below “Barriers to Arbitration” at page 31. 
111  Campos, above n 91, at 371; and Park, above n 66, at 809. 
112  Groen, above n 48, at 7. 
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process and the control is left in the hands of the contracting states.113 Compared to other 
processes such as domestic court proceedings where the facts, legal arguments and 
reasoning are open to the public, the MAP procedure is prone to pragmatic compromise 
which may not reflect the principle on which the taxpayer’s claim was based. Rather than 
settling a case in a way which protects and respects the application of the DTA, an 
agreement may be reached which best suits the state irrespective of the interests of the 
taxpayer or the correct interpretation of the DTA.114 Each competent authority is not bound 
by the interpretations of the previous MAP case and there may be different negotiating 
positions dependent on a range of factors such as the opposing state, the potential tax gain 
or loss in question and the tax policy of the time. 
 
IV Arbitration as a Dispute Resolution Procedure 
This part of the paper will look briefly at the proliferation and acceptance of arbitration in 
international law. It will then focus specifically on the introduction of arbitration into the 
MDTC. 
 
A A Brief History of International Arbitration 
The use of arbitration can be traced back to early accounts of Greek mythology, the Roman 
Empire and economic disputes in the Middle Ages through the law merchant.115 It is an 
effective tool at settling disagreements and preserving relationships.116 The Treaty of 
Amity, Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Great Britain in 1794, 
more commonly known as Jay’s Treaty, included arbitration mechanisms to settle various 
disputes.117 Jay’s Treaty signalled the beginning of a period of acceptance of arbitration as 
a preferred mechanism to resolve inter-state disputes.118 
 
  
113  OECD “Commentaries on the Articles of the Model Tax Convention” article 25 at [10]. 
114  Liege Scholsem “EC: The Proposal for a Council Directive on the Elimination of Double Taxation 
(Arbitration Procedure)” (1982) 11 Intertax 424 at 433. 
115  Gary Born International Arbitration: Cases and Materials (Kluwer Law International, The 
Netherlands, 2011) at 2–4; Henry Fraser “Sketch of the History of International Arbitration” (1926) 
11Cornell LQ 179 at 185, 190; and Law Commission Arbitration (NZLC R20, 1991) at 62. 
116  Born, above n 115, at 4; and Michael Mustill “Arbitration: History and Background” (1989) 6(2) 
Journal of International Arbitration 43. 
117  Chittharanjan F Amerasinghe International Litigation in Practice: International Arbitration 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Netherlands, 2011) at 7.  
118  Born, above n 115, at 5; and Jonathan Charney “Third Party Dispute Settlement and International 
Law” (1998) 36 Colum J Transnatl L 65 at 68. 
21 JOSHUA CHARLES RAYMOND AIRD 300225247 
 
  
The first attempt to unify the rules of inter-state arbitration was the little recognised 1875 
project of the Institut de Droit International.119 The Institut acknowledged the growing 
trend of international arbitration and hoped to encourage its use, and uniformity, by setting 
forth rules for ad hoc arbitration agreements.120 By 1899, with the conclusion of The Hague 
Convention and the establishment of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), arbitration 
had cemented itself as an efficient and preferred method of settling international 
disputes.121 Indeed it was explicitly recognised as a favoured method of resolving disputes 
between states.122  
 
B Introduction of Arbitration into Tax Law 
The earliest tax treaties between the United Kingdom and Irish Free State in 1926 
incorporated binding arbitral awards.123 Later, the Czechoslovakia and Romania treaty 
allowed for binding arbitration by the Fiscal Committee of the League of Nations should a 
dispute arise as to the interpretation of the treaty.124 This form of dispute resolution was 
then overshadowed by MAP.125 The OECD was not the first organisation to moot the re-
introduction of arbitration as the proper dispute mechanism for tax treaties. The 
Commission of the European Communities proposed an arbitration procedure in 1976 to 
the then European Community.126 It provided for binding arbitration and mandatory 
dispute settlement when disputes as to the interpretation of the internal European 
Community Tax Agreements arose. The arbitral award would have been binding on all 
states in the European Community.127 Ultimately, it was not adopted.  
  
119  Institut de Droit International “Projet de Règlement Pour la Procédure Arbitrale Internationale” 
Rsolution (1875). 
120  Born, above n 115, at 28. 
121  Born, above n 115, at 28; Charney, above n 118, at 68; and Mustill, above n 116,at 48. 
122  Convention for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes (July 1899); art 16 which reads:  
“In questions of a legal nature, and especially in the interpretation or application of 
International Conventions, arbitration is recognized by the Signatory Powers as the 
most effective, and at the same time the most equitable, means of settling disputes 
which diplomacy has failed to settle.” 
123  Agreement between the British Government and the Government of the Irish Free State in Respect 
of Double Taxation Tax, art. 7, (14, April 1926). 
124  Convention between the Kingdom of Romania and the Czechoslovak Republic Concerning Double 
Taxation in Connection With Succession (20 June 1934); Bertolini and Weaver, above n 29, at 4–5; 
and Lindencrona, above n 30, at 266. 
125  See discussion above “Early Dispute Resolution Provisions—a forerunner to MAP” at page 10. 
126  Lindencrona, above n 30, at 268; and Scholsem, above n 114, at 424. 
127  Lindencrona, above n 30, at 268. 
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After a prolonged hiatus, arbitration re-emerged in a 2003 OECD questionnaire issued to 
the business community on dispute resolution mechanisms in the MDTC.128 Although 
predominantly focused on MAP it also invited comment on arbitration and mediation as 
suitable alternatives or complementary measures.129 To understand the significance of this, 
and the importance of the OECD recognising arbitration as a viable alternative, it is 
important to take into account the way in which the OECD formulates and agrees upon the 
contents of the MDTC.  
 
1 Decision making in the OECD  
The OECD is organised under the Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development.130 The convention envisaged, and the OECD operates, on the 
basis of consensus among members rather than through a supranational executive.131 Tax 
policy is developed by three interconnecting networks within the OECD: the OECD 
Council, the Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, and the Committee on Fiscal 
Affairs.132 Interested parties from member and non-member states as well as stakeholders 
(such as the International Chamber of Commerce, the Confederation of British Industry, 
and other international advocacy groups) influence the development of policy through 
meetings, conferences and informal gatherings.133  
 
The OECD Council, made up of high ranking member state officials, is responsible for 
issuing consensus statements about the work and direction of the OECD’s tax policy. 
Policies are then developed by smaller groups that come within the target areas of the 
Council’s statements. In effect the job of the Council is to not mandate specific policy but 
  
128  Markham, above n 93, at 68.  
129  Centre for Tax Policy and Administration “Questionnaire for Business on Procedures for Resolving 
International Tax Disputes” OECD (2003) at 4 which stated: “Please provide us with your 
experience, or any views you might have on international tax dispute resolution mechanisms other 
than MAP (e.g. arbitration or mediation).” 
130  Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 1961 UNTS 888 
(opened for signature 14 December 1960, entered into force 30 September 1961).  
131  Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 1961 UNTS 888 
(opened for signature 14 December 1960, entered into force 30 September 1961), art 6; Christians, 
above n 6, at 17; and Rosenbloom and others, above n 6, at 59.  
132  Christians, above n 6, at 17; and OECD “Who Does What?” <www.oecd.org>. 
133  Christians, above n 6, at 17. 
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to indicate areas for working groups to generate policy which will then be approved by the 
Council.134   
 
The Centre for Tax Policy and Administration is the expert network gathered to negotiate 
common positions on the Council mandated policy area. These experts are not national 
representatives but individuals employed by the OECD to formulate policy. Often 
however, their past experience, regularly in tax departments of member states, will 
influence their thinking.135 The Centre also convenes collaborative meetings with 
representatives from various interest groups, states and regional groups. A main portion of 
the Centre’s work is to coordinate and manage the work of the Committee on Fiscal Affairs, 
where the majority of the work is completed.  
 
The Committee is an umbrella entity with working groups reporting to it. The membership 
of these working groups is much wider than the Council and Centre and is made up of state 
representatives and independent advisory and representative groups. These working groups 
hold an important and influential position in crafting the international tax law.136 The 
development of policy by the OECD is not a typical “command-and-control regulation” 
style, rather it is based on open coordination and agreement between state players.137 While 
there may be participants who can exert more influence than others, the fundamental core 
of the OECD is that all policy and outcomes are on a consensus basis.138 The OECD 
attempts to facilitate the establishment of patterns and structures for future state 
behaviour.139 Though member states are not bound by what the OECD decides the OECD 
does attempt to create international norms. It does this through developing what it calls 
“standards and guidelines” which act as a benchmark in terms of international tax policy 
which states attempt to reach.140 There may however, be legitimate considerations for states 
who oppose the adopted OECD position and in doing so differ in some respects to the 
MDTC. Nevertheless the incorporation of arbitration into model tax agreements recognises 
  
134  Christians, above n 6, at 18. 
135  Christians, above n 6, at 20. 
136  Christians, above n 6, at 22. 
137  Christians, above n 6, at 22. 
138  Christians, above n 6, at 17; and Rosenbloom and others, above n 6, at 59. 
139  Christians, above n 1, at 1450. 
140  OECD OECD’s Current Tax Agenda (June 2010) at 5. 
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the normalisation of arbitration and the expectation that disputes would be resolved through 
an adjudicatory method.141 
 
V Arbitration in the MDTC 
This part of the paper will focus on the inclusion of arbitration in the MDTC. It will discuss 
the current arbitration process and the competing methods of arbitration that are available. 
It will then discuss some of the objections to the implementation of arbitration in the area 
of tax law before finally moving on to the benefits that arbitration can provide.  
 
A Current Arbitration Model 
The current arbitration model, found in art 25 of the MDTC, it provides that:142 
 
5. Where, 
  
(a) under paragraph 1, a person has presented a case to the competent authority of a 
Contracting State on the basis that the actions of one or both of the Contracting 
States have resulted for that person in taxation not in accordance with the 
provisions of this Convention, and 
(b) the competent authorities are unable to reach an agreement to resolve that case 
pursuant to paragraph 2 within two years from the presentation of the case to the 
competent authority of the other Contracting State, 
 
any unresolved issues arising from the case shall be submitted to arbitration if the 
person so requests. These unresolved issues shall not, however, be submitted to 
arbitration if a decision on these issues has already been rendered by a court or 
administrative tribunal of either State. Unless a person directly affected by the case 
does not accept the mutual agreement that implements the arbitration decision, that 
decision shall be binding on both Contracting States and shall be implemented 
notwithstanding any time limits in the domestic laws of these States. The competent 
authorities of the Contracting States shall by mutual agreement settle the mode of 
application of this paragraph.143 
  
141  Anna Spain “International Dispute Resolution in an Era of Globalisation” in Andrew Byrnes and 
others (eds) International Law in the New Age of Globalization (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Boston, 2013) 41 at 51. 
142  OECD Model Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital 2014, art 25(5) (footnotes 
included). 
143  In some States, national law, policy or administrative considerations may not allow or justify the 
type of dispute resolution envisaged under this paragraph. In addition, some States may only wish 
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1 Arbitration process 
The arbitration provision has changed little since its inception in 2008. The process remains 
fundamentally the same. If a taxpayer believes that they have not been taxed in accordance 
with the DTA they must first petition the competent authority in the state in which they are 
tax resident. This will engage the MAP process and the two states will negotiate and 
endeavour to find a resolution. If there remains any unresolved issues after two years of 
negotiation the taxpayer may request the two states to go to arbitration to resolve the 
“unresolved issues”. Once the states have been compelled to enter into arbitration they 
must agree on the content and scope of the matters that are to be arbitrated and the form 
that the arbitration will take.  
 
The OECD has provided a model arbitration protocol which sets out all aspects from 
selection of arbitrators, payment of costs and hearing practices. It is up to the states 
however, to negotiate the arbitration protocol as they are not bound by the OECD model. 
Both the arbitration clause and protocol will be assessed in the following sections. Once 
the arbitral award has been issued the taxpayer may reject or accept this award. If accepted, 
the two states will incorporate the award into the MAP agreement to resolve the taxation 
not in accordance with the DTA.  
 
2 Competing arbitration procedures 
The OECD provides a sample arbitration protocol. States are free to modify, add or delete 
any provisions.144 While many states may use this sample protocol New Zealand’s position 
is unclear. While there is a skeletal protocol available in the Japan-New Zealand DTA, 
requests to view the complete arbitration protocol have been denied.145 There are two 
competing approaches to arbitration which states may decide to implement.  
 
  
to include this paragraph in treaties with certain States. For these reasons, the paragraph should only 
be included in the Convention where each State concludes that it would be appropriate to do so 
based on the factors described in paragraph 65 of the Commentary on the paragraph. As mentioned 
in paragraph 74 of that Commentary, however, other States may be able to agree to remove from the 
paragraph the condition that issues may not be submitted to arbitration if a decision on these issues 
has already been rendered by one of their courts or administrative tribunals. 
144  OECD “Commentaries on the Articles of the Model Tax Convention” Annex: Sample Mutual 
Agreement on Arbitration. 
145  Double Tax Agreements (Japan) Order 2013, sch 2. 
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Independent arbitration allows the arbitrators, presented with the facts and arguments from 
each state, to reach their own independent decision.146 The procedure is much like a 
domestic court litigation. The parties may present written submissions, call witnesses and 
give oral submissions.147  
 
The second arbitration method which OECD contemplates is baseball arbitration.148 
Baseball arbitration is a process in which the parties narrow the risk to themselves. This is 
achieved by limiting the scope of the arbitral award to one of two competing positions; that 
of State A or State B.149 In this form of arbitration both parties submit their positions to the 
arbitrators and the tribunal selects the offer which comes closest to its own interpretation 
of the DTA.150 The arbitrators are not required to present their interpretation of the DTA, 
rather they simply select whichever interpretation, is the closest to their own.151 There is 
no scope to split the two offers down the middle.152 While it is useful in that it gets the 
parties to rationalise their interpretations—as an irrational interpretation is less likely to be 
selected—these awards are often devoid of legal reasoning, only indicating the decision 
and not the basis on which the decision was made.153 
 
3 Compulsory nature of arbitration 
Progressing a dispute to arbitration is not dependent on contemporaneous authorisation by 
the competent authorities, rather there is standing consent to arbitrate any “unresolved 
issues” once the procedural requirement—two years of MAP—has been met.154 Like MAP 
the arbitration provision is initiated at the request of the taxpayer and the contracting states 
  
146  Born, above n 115, at 8; and Julian Lew, Loukas Mistelis and Stefan Kroll Comparative 
International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2003) at 4. 
147  Alan Redfern and others Law and Practice of International Commerical Arbitration (5th ed, Sweet 
& Maxwell, London, 2009) at 278. 
148  OECD “Commentaries on the Articles of the Model Tax Convention” Annex: Sample Mutual 
Agreement on Arbitration at 3. 
149  Lew, Mistelis and Kroll, above n 146, at 13. 
150  Lew, Mistelis and Kroll, above n 146, at 13. 
151  Lew, Mistelis and Kroll, above n 146, at 13. 
152  James Fuller and Barton Bassett “International Tax Controversies” (2008) 34 IntlTaxJ 15 at 16. 
153  Hugh J Ault “Improving the Resolution of International Tax Disputes” (2006) 7 Fla Tax Rev 137 at 
149; Lew, Mistelis and Kroll, above n 146, at 13; Fuller and Bassett, above n 152, at 17; and David 
Rosenbloom “Mandatory Arbitration of Disputes Pursuant to Tax Treaties: The Experience of the 
United States” (forthcoming). 
154  OECD Model Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital 2014, art 25(5)(b) and 
OECD “Commentaries on the Articles of the Model Tax Convention” article 25 at [63]. 
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are obliged to enter arbitration if so requested.155 Arbitration is not an alternative procedure 
for settling disputes, rather it is a subsequent procedure or second step in the process.156 
 
While it is possible for states to accept arbitration after the conclusion of the DTA,157 in 
order for the arbitration provision to be truly effective there needs to be standing consent 
to arbitration.  If the acceptance of arbitration is delayed until after a dispute has arisen then 
it may be subject to “gamesmanship” between the contracting parties.158 The current 
MDTC is effective in this regard as it provides for arbitration which can be compelled by 
the taxpayer.159 There may however, be a further deficiency in regards the scope of the 
arbitration clause and the competence of the tribunal. 
 
4 Subject matter of the arbitration 
The arbitration agreement as included in the MDTC envisages that “any unresolved issues” 
from MAP will be presented to arbitration. This is potentially a very wide and inclusive 
standing consent. It is the two competent authorities who will decide whether there are any 
unresolved issues however.160 The OECD Commentary to the arbitration provision 
provides that:161  
 
[t]he arbitration process provided for by the paragraph is not an alternative or 
additional recourse: where the competent authorities have reached agreement that does 
not leave any unresolved issues as regards the application of the Convention, there are 
no unresolved issues that can be brought to arbitration even if the person who made 
the mutual agreement request does not consider that the agreement reached by the 
competent authorities provides a correct resolution to the case. 
 
It therefore seems that arbitration is not available to settle the interpretation of the DTA 
when questions are raised by the taxpayer—that there is taxation not in accordance with 
the DTA—but where the competent authorities consider that the taxation is in accordance 
  
155  OECD Model Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital 2014, art 25(5); and Burch, 
Nottage and Williams, above n 4, at 1041. 
156  OECD Articles of the Model Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital 2008, art 
25(5); Coombes, above n 4, at 17; and Sporken and Bouman, above n 66, at 19.  
157  OECD “Commentaries on the Articles of the Model Tax Convention” article 25 at [69]. 
158  Park, above n 66, at 804. 
159  OECD Model Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital 2014, art 25(5). 
160  OECD “Commentaries on the Articles of the Model Tax Convention” article 25 at [71]. 
161  OECD “Commentaries on the Articles of the Model Tax Convention” article 25 at [64]. 
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with the DTA. While this at first glance may seem limiting, it is consistent with the nature 
of DTAs. DTAs are first and foremost bilateral agreements between states. If the states 
agree to an interpretation, regardless of what a third party believes, there is no dispute 
between the parties and therefore no basis for arbitration. 
 
What the limit to “unresolved issues” also does is reiterate that arbitration is a second step 
in the resolution of the dispute and not an alternative dispute resolution mechanism. It is 
not the whole case that is submitted to arbitration rather only distinct issues that remain 
unresolved after MAP negotiations. The case as a whole remains within the ambit of the 
MAP and is settled through that process.162 The practical effects of this circumscribed 
jurisdiction may be limited however, as all issues will eventually be resolved—either 
through negotiation or arbitration. What this serves to illustrate however, is the restricted 
nature of the arbitration model that has been incorporated by the OECD.  
 
States can further limit the competence of the arbitral tribunal.163 Indeed, New Zealand in 
its DTA with Australia, has altered the scope and competence of the tribunal by providing 
that arbitration will only apply in respect of:164 
 
a) issues of fact; and 
b) issues which the Government of Australia and the Government of New Zealand 
agree, in an Exchange of Notes, shall be covered by the provisions of paragraph 6 
[the arbitration provision]. 
 
This has the effect of limiting the mandatory arbitration to issues of fact which may provide 
little remedy when the issue in dispute is the interpretation of the agreement, or indeed the 
classification of income which will necessarily involve questions of law.  
 
What this restriction does in essence to the arbitration clause is transform the standing 
consent clause into an optional arbitration clause. It removes the ability of arbitration to act 
as a ‘stick’ to resolving the MAP process sooner and has little practical utility.165 Given 
that the states are not able to agree on the interpretation of the treaty and the concerns that 
  
162  OECD “Commentaries on the Articles of the Model Tax Convention” article 25 at [64]. 
163  OECD “Commentaries on the Articles of the Model Tax Convention” article 25 at [66]. 
164  Double Taxation Relief (Australia) Order 2010, sch 1, art 25(7). 
165  Sarah G Nowland “Three’s (Not) a Crowd in International Tax Arbitration: International Tax 
Arbitration as a Development of International Commercial Arbitration Rather than a MAP Fix” 
(2014) 37 Hastings Int'l & Comp L Rev 183 at 191; and Park, above n 66, at 811. See also below 
“Is This an Effective Arbitration Procedure” at page 34. 
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many states have with regard to arbitration in the area of tax, explained below, there is 
enormous risk in relying on this provision and other post dispute arbitration agreement 
provisions.166  
 
5 Confidentiality 
Confidentiality of arbitral awards is a “contentious and unsettled subject”.167 While some 
argue that confidentiality is a key component of arbitration,168 others argue that it is 
unnecessary especially given the range of important topics that arbitration traverses and the 
benefit that would come from the publication of the awards.169 Inter-state arbitration 
specifically has been subject to a liberalisation of the principle of confidentiality.170 
Furthermore in Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Plowman the High Court of Australia 
recognised that confidentiality yields to the right of the public to gain information.171 While 
not dealing specifically with inter-state arbitration the Court did note that the public must 
be able to obtain information regarding a public authority and the exercise of public power; 
this right of the public must prevail over the confidentiality of the arbitral proceedings.172  
 
New Zealand responded to the Esso decision by inserting s 14 into the Arbitration Act 
which implies a term of confidentiality into arbitration agreements.173 Confidentiality of 
arbitration was further strengthened with the Arbitration Amendment Act 2007 which 
inserted ss 14A–14H into the Arbitration Act.174 These sections provide for a 
comprehensive scheme setting extremely high expectations for the confidentiality of 
arbitration. The focus of the Arbitration Act is specifically on domestic arbitration 
however. The Law Commission, which proposed the initial 1996 Act and its 2007 
amendments, did not intend the provisions to apply to inter-state arbitration. Indeed the 
  
166  Park, above n 66, at 811. 
167  Born, above n 115, at 791. 
168  See generally Patrick Neil “Confidentiality in Arbitration” (1996) 12 Arb Intl 287; and Mabel Egonu 
“Investor State Arbitration under ICSID: A Case for Presumption against Confidentiality” (2007) 
24(5) Journal of International Arbitration 479. 
169  See generally Michael Collins “Privacy and Confidentiality in Arbitration Proceedings” (1995) 30 
Tex Intl L J 121. 
170  Bernardo Cremades and Rodrigo Cortes “The Principle of Confidentiality in Arbitration: A 
Necessary Crisis” (2013) 23 J Arb Stud 25 at 27. 
171  Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Plowman [1995] HCA 19. 
172  Cremades and Cortes, above n 170, at 30. 
173  Law Commission Improving the Arbitration Act 1996 (NZLC R83, 2003) at 3. 
174  See generally Law Commission, above n 173. 
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Law Commission specifically recognised that, appropriately so, different rules apply to the 
confidentiality of inter-state arbitration.175 
 
The OECD goes some way to recognising that strict confidentiality is not always 
appropriate in inter-state arbitrations and that a greater degree of publicness is necessary. 
The OECD includes, in its sample arbitration protocol, provision for the publication of 
awards, it states:176 
 
with the permission of the person who made the request for arbitration and both 
competent authorities the decision of the arbitral panel will be made public in redacted 
form without mentioning the names of the parties involved or any details that might 
disclose their identity …  
 
As can be seen, while there is provision for the publication of awards, it is very weak. 
Publication is, in essence, at the approval of the taxpayer, a party who is not directly 
involved in the arbitration or the DTA. Furthermore, the state parties may be reluctant to 
allow arbitration awards to be released publicly as this could hamper future negotiation 
positions. Although the OECD explicitly provides that “the decision has no formal 
precedential value”,177 tribunals in other fields have shown “a high degree willingness to 
draw upon previous awards” which may hinder states bargaining positions in future MAP 
negotiations and arbitrations.178  
 
New Zealand seems to be pursuing a stricter position on confidentiality. The parts of the 
New Zealand-Japan protocol that are available do not contemplate any publication of an 
award.179 Article 27 of the DTA states that all information provided in arbitration is to be 
treated as secret and only disclosed for the purposes of assessment or collection of taxes. 
This also applies to all individuals associated with the arbitration who must sign 
  
175  Law Commission, above n 173, at [22]. 
176  OECD “Commentaries on the Articles of the Model Tax Convention” Annex: Sample Mutual 
Agreement on Arbitration, art 15. 
177  OECD “Commentaries on the Articles of the Model Tax Convention” Annex: Sample Mutual 
Agreement on Arbitration, art 15. 
178  Gary Born International Arbitration: Law and Practice (Kluwer Law International, The 
Netherlands, 2012) at 365; Campbell McLachlan, Laurence Shore and Matthew Weiniger 
International Arbitration: Substantive Principles (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007) at [7.99]; 
and Rolf Schutze “The Precedential Effect of Arbitration Decisions” (1994) 11(3) Journal of 
International Arbitration 69. 
179  Double Tax Agreements (Japan) Order 2013, sch 1 art 27 and sch 2 cl 16(b)(iv). 
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confidentiality agreements.180 This is in stark contrast to domestic court judgments 
concerning tax liability which are published. 
 
Overall, the MDTC incorporates a much more confidential approach to the publication of 
awards than is traditionally considered appropriate in inter-state arbitration. New Zealand 
has adopted the position, in relation to confidentiality, of the subject matter (tax) and not 
the forum (inter-state arbitration). At a fundamental level this is understandable as “total 
confidentiality of assessments and of negotiations between individuals and the revenue is 
a vital elements in the working of the system”.181 However, an uncompromising approach 
to confidentiality ignores the forum of the dispute and as will be discussed in Part VII may 
hamper the development of an effective dispute settlement regime. 
 
6 Barriers to arbitration 
The arbitration provision provides that unresolved issues may not “be submitted to 
arbitration if a decision on these issues has already been rendered by a court or 
administrative tribunal of either State”.182 If the arbitration is a true inter-state arbitration, 
it is axiomatic that the decisions of domestic courts would not bind the international 
tribunal.183 It would be free to decide the case according to international law and its own 
interpretation of the DTA even if a domestic court has rendered a decision. The OECD 
however, is not concerned with whether a domestic court would bind or impact an 
international tribunal, it is concerned with whether or not the award of that tribunal could 
be implemented. 
 
The OECD is concerned that an arbitral award may be rendered nugatory as competent 
authorities are not able to implement awards which are contrary to the decision of a 
domestic court or tribunal. Take the simplified example of the New Zealand tax resident 
who travels to the US to produce a record album and is not taxed in accordance with the 
relevant DTA. The taxpayer proceeds to the New Zealand domestic courts to enforce the 
provisions of the DTA which are incorporated domestically. The courts judge the payment 
as royalties and not income for services provided in the music industry, and therefore under 
  
180  Double Tax Agreements (Japan) Order 2013, sch 2 cl 16(b)(iv). 
181  IRC v National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd [1982] AC 617 at 633 per 
Wilberforce LJ. 
182  OECD Model Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital 2014, art 25(5). 
183  International Law Commission Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, 2001 [2001] 2 (2) YB ILC 26 art 3; and McLachlan, Shore and Weiniger, above n 
178, at [4.13]. 
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the provisions of the DTA it is taxable at up to 5 per cent in the US and at the full rate in 
New Zealand. The taxpayer may object however, as classification as royalties results in 
higher taxes. The taxpayer then petitions the competent authority in New Zealand 
requesting MAP between the two states and after two years of the issue not being resolved, 
arbitration. If the arbitral tribunal decides that the payment is income for services provided 
in the music industry and not royalties, New Zealand must tax the income as income for 
services provided to the music industry. If the New Zealand Inland Revenue Department 
(IRD) taxes the $10,000 as income for services provided however, they are acting 
unlawfully as according to the prior court judgment the IRD must tax this as royalties. 
However, if New Zealand chooses not to exercise its right to tax the income, as DTAs 
create a permissive not prescriptive taxing rights, the taxpayer pays no tax at all, as the US 
has no right to tax the income for services provided to the music industry, and receives a 
windfall. 
 
These conflicting decisions may result in taxation not in accordance with the DTA or a 
windfall for the taxpayer. It is important to note however, that the competence of the arbitral 
tribunal is not affected, rather pursuing domestic court remedies constitutes a waiver of 
arbitration by the taxpayer. 
 
For this reason states will often require the suspension of domestic remedies before 
pursuing MAP and arbitration.184 If a taxpayer does exhaust domestic remedies in one state 
and this does not result in a satisfactory decision the taxpayer is free to pursue domestic 
remedies in the other state. This may be through the courts or unilateral action from the 
competent authority. 
 
7 No direct taxpayer involvement 
The arbitration procedure is not separate from but rather an extension of the MAP process. 
As such, the taxpayer has the same rights and responsibilities in arbitration as they do in 
MAP—no right to be heard and the obligation to provide the information sought by the 
competent authorities.185 Although the taxpayer initiates the arbitration process by 
request,186 the taxpayer is not a party to the arbitration; it is inherently an inter-state 
arbitration.187 This is similar to other dispute resolution regimes where individuals are 
  
184  OECD “Commentaries on the Articles of the Model Tax Convention” article 25 at [76a]. 
185  See generally Rosenbloom, above n 153. 
186  OECD Model Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital 2014, art 25(5). 
187  Fuller and Bassett, above n 152, at 16. 
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adversely affected but it is states who take claims. The World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
for example, includes a dispute resolution system in which states bring claims when it is 
an individual who has suffered a loss.188 The individual has no right to bring a challenge to 
a state’s decision.189 
 
While the OECD has indicated that the states could allow taxpayers the right to be involved 
in the arbitration, it is entirely at the option of the states.190 These details are finalised in 
the arbitration protocols which the two states agree. These protocols cover things such as 
the establishment of the tribunal, who bears the costs of the arbitration proceedings and the 
workings of the arbitral tribunal, including the rights of taxpayers. 
 
As mentioned about, the IRD has refused to release the arbitration protocols to the public. 
This is despite the OECD recommending that they be made public to ensure confidence in 
the process.191 While the agreement with Japan does have a publically available arbitration 
protocol in sch 2,192 this is minimal and does not cover all aspects and makes no reference 
to the taxpayer or their rights. Therefore, it is entirely possible that there is no protection 
afforded to the taxpayer at all. This may be a severe oversight as the less involvement a 
taxpayer has in the process the more likely it is the taxpayer will refuse the award.193 
 
8 Taxpayer’s refusal of the arbitral award 
If a taxpayer chooses to proceed to arbitration, and an unsatisfactory award is delivered, 
the taxpayer may refuse the award and engage domestic remedies.194 This severely limits 
the effectiveness of arbitration which is designed to facilitate an agreement between the 
states.195 The OECD has defended this position however, by commenting that this fits 
within the principle of the arbitration provision. The OECD states that:196 
  
188  Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization 1867 UNTS 3 (opened for 
signature 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995) annex 2 art 1. 
189  Park, above n 66, at 848. 
190  OECD “Commentaries on the Articles of the Model Tax Convention” Annex: Sample Mutual 
Agreement on Arbitration, art 11. 
191  OECD “Commentaries on the Articles of the Model Tax Convention” article 25 at [85]. 
192  Double Tax Agreements (Japan) Order 2013, sch 2. 
193  Nowland, above n 165, at 191. 
194  OECD Model Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital 2014, art 25(5) and OECD 
“Commentaries on the Articles of the Model Tax Convention” article 25 at [77]. 
195  Burch, Nottage and Williams, above n 4, at 1041. 
196  OECD “Commentaries on the Articles of the Model Tax Convention” article 25 at [78]. 
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the purpose of [arbitration] is to allow the competent authorities to reach a conclusion 
on the unresolved issues that prevent an agreement from being reached. When that 
agreement is achieved [through] the aid of arbitration, the essential character of the 
mutual agreement remains the same. 
 
The OECD remains firm in its position that arbitration is not designed to resolve the issue 
of taxation that is not in accordance with the DTA, rather it is designed to assist the 
competent authorities in that resolution. It is suggested that this is an unsatisfactory state 
of affairs. The award “must bind taxpayer and fiscal authorities alike”.197 To do otherwise 
would overlook the purpose of introducing an arbitration provision and relegate arbitration 
to nothing more than a fact finding mission and “foreplay to future litigation”.198 
 
B Is This an Effective Arbitration Procedure? 
One of the most distinct advantages that was to accompany the introduction of arbitration 
was a definite resolution to instances of taxation not in accordance with the DTA. 199 The 
need for change was evident; prior to the introduction of arbitration there were instances 
of some MAP cases extending beyond 10 years without a resolution.200 The current 
arbitration provision is intended to act as a ‘stick’, encouraging the two states to reach a 
mutually agreeable decision.201 It attempts to do this in two ways.  
 
The first is that a third party, divorced of personal interest in the matter, will purportedly 
decide the tax rights of a state if a case goes to arbitration. States are attuned to the supposed 
encroachment onto sovereignty and will be wary of divesting themselves of the power to 
tax.202 They may be more likely to negotiate a settlement than subject the claim to what 
some perceive as a fox guarding the chicken coop.203 The validity of this objection 
  
197  Park, above n 66, at 805; and Nowland, above n 165, at 191. 
198  Park, above n 66, at 805. 
199  Campos, above n 91, at 372; and Dalton, above n 85, at 16. 
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however, also depends on one’s conception of sovereignty. The arbitration provision in the 
DTA may also be seen as an exercise of sovereignty, not an encroachment upon it. 
 
The second way arbitration can work as a stick is because of the extra time and costs that 
are incurred with arbitration proceedings. The costs, although less than a typical tax trial, 
increase with the initiation of arbitration. Because the costs of arbitration fall squarely on 
the contracting states, not the taxpayer, this may encourage the competent authorities to 
resolve the dispute sooner.204  
 
Whether arbitration has actually worked as a stick is arguable. As noted above, only 
“unresolved issues” are submitted to arbitration, which the competent authorities can 
control.205 Furthermore, the taxpayer can refuse any arbitral award, and the arbitration 
provision and protocol may be manipulated by the contracting states, diluting its 
effectiveness. With an ineffective procedure the question also arises as to whether or not 
this process is truly arbitration. 
 
VI Is it Really Arbitration? 
There is no one definition of arbitration.206 It has been described as: a private device for 
dispute settlement,207 a judicial determination outside of courts, and even a “social 
jurisdiction”.208  The first true definition of inter-state arbitration may have come from the 
1899 Hague Convention which described arbitration as “the settlement of differences 
between States by judges of their own choice, and on the basis of respect for law”.209 
Domestic legislation rarely defines arbitration but rather sets out the principles or purposes 
of arbitration.210 In essence, while consensus as to the definition of arbitration may be 
unattainable there is a well-recognised irreducible core which each process must contain in 
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order to secure the title of arbitration.211 In this part of the paper I will reflect on these 
irreducible elements and analyse whether the MDTC arbitration process can truly carry the 
label of arbitration. This analysis will provide the basis for the recommendations that 
follow in the next part of the paper. 
 
A Binding Arbitration 
The first element that is essential to all arbitrations is that they are binding on the parties.212 
After all the object of progressing to arbitration is to end the dispute.213 Advisory opinions 
are not within the ambit of arbitration and are better served through other alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms. Arbitration is a binding dispute resolution tool for a particular case. 
It is not designed to set binding precedent for future cases, or set out a recommended course 
of conduct for future action by the parties. While some limited precedential value may 
ultimately be ascribed to a body of unanimous arbitral awards that is not the purpose of 
arbitration. Ultimately, it is to facilitate a judicial settlement of the case presented to the 
arbitral tribunal. 
 
The taxpayer has the ability to decline the arbitral award and resort to domestic remedies. 
It is unclear whether the arbitral award is binding on the states in any event. This is because 
any arbitral award designed to assist the competent authorities in the resolution of particular 
and distinct issues within the case as a whole. The arbitral award must be incorporated into 
a MAP agreement to which the states then agree. Though unlikely, it is permissible, in 
theory, for the contracting states to disregard the arbitral award so long as they can agree 
to a position, then incorporated through a MAP agreement, to taxation in accordance with 
the DTA.  
 
This is a similar format to the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade dispute settlement 
regime which required both states to accept the arbitral award before it would be binding.214 
This was one of the main reasons for the WTO revising its dispute resolution regime 
  
211  Born, above n 178, at 4; Lew, Mistelis and Kroll, above n 146, at 3; Jakubowski, above n 208, at 
177; and Law Commission, above n 115, at 59. 
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because this process was ineffectual as “the losing party in a dispute could block the 
adoption of a panel ruling”.215  
 
The WTO contains a binding dispute settlement where a Panel is commissioned by a larger 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) to settle trade disputes. The decision of the Panel, which 
hears submissions and evidence, is binding on the parties unless the DSB decides 
unanimously to reject it.216 This is much more in line with the fundamental basis of 
arbitration as being a binding dispute settlement process. The parties to the dispute do not 
have the ability to reject the findings of the Panel or the DSB. The individual is severely 
disadvantaged however, as they cannot rely on the decision of the Panel or DSB.217 The 
state breaching its obligations must independently remove the illegal tariff or face 
retaliation from other states. 
 
Arbitration generally does not include a power to take into account new facts after an award 
has been issued, nor is there a general right of appeal.218 A request for the annulment of an 
award however, will be permissible when “the tribunal has transgressed a basic rule of 
judicial procedure” which leads to the award losing “its judicial character”.219  
 
The current model of arbitration in the MDTC does not facilitate a binding award.  Rather 
the current arbitration model is akin to a fact finding process or an advisory opinion. While 
the fact finding process is invaluable at international law, this is not the role of arbitration. 
The role of fact finding is traditionally left to Commissions of Inquiry.220 Commissions of 
Inquiry are heavily used domestically and by international institutions, in particular the 
UN. While there is no doubt fact finding in arbitration, as each party will present their 
version of events and the tribunal will be required to decide, this is done in the context of 
a larger dispute resolution process.221 If the parties want to ensure that they have the correct 
facts to determine the tax rights and obligations arbitration is an inefficient and unusual 
means to employ. Both international and domestic law have a robust process for fact 
finding and to substitute this process for arbitration is not effective. 
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B Arbitration as an Alternative to National Courts 
An allied element of binding arbitration is that arbitration is to be an alternative to national 
courts.222 Arbitration is designed to facilitate the settlement of a dispute outside of the 
boundaries of domestic court litigation. The rationale for this is that arbitration can provide 
a more flexible process which can be adapted to the dispute at hand.223 Different disputes 
may be better catered to with different procedural rules.224  
 
As discussed above,225 the OECD currently envisages a restriction on the availability of 
MAP and arbitration when a decision has been reached by domestic courts.226 This does 
not apply in the inverse however. If a taxpayer petitions for MAP and a decision of an 
arbitral tribunal has been rendered, which the taxpayer refuses to accept, the taxpayer is 
free to pursue domestic remedies. This undermines the effectiveness of arbitration as an 
alternative dispute resolution mechanism. In essence it creates a hierarchy of tribunals. 
Each step is effectively an appeal from the last, with the domestic courts being the final 
decision-maker. 
 
Arbitration in the MDTC does not act as an effective alternative to national courts. Rather 
it relegates itself to a preliminary or advisory opinion which the taxpayer could then 
override through the domestic courts. It does not meet the fundamental tenets of arbitration 
to resolve matters quickly, effectively and with finality.227 
 
C Party Autonomy 
Arbitration is principally a process in which the parties have complete control over the 
process.228 Arbitration requires the parties to “set up the machinery” through which the 
tribunal will resolve the dispute.229 It is up to the parties to select the arbitrators,230 define 
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39 JOSHUA CHARLES RAYMOND AIRD 300225247 
 
  
the issues to be resolved by the tribunal,231 and to set down the process the tribunal will 
follow.232 This autonomy is recognised by the MDTC, although the OECD has issued 
guidance as to the appropriate process for the arbitration, it remains non-binding and up to 
the parties to conclude the final protocol. 
 
Party autonomy has been described as the “ultimate power” in arbitration proceedings.233 
This power is recognised by most domestic jurisdictions which will only impose 
restrictions or provisions when the arbitral provision is silent.234 Party autonomy is not fully 
present in the OECD model of arbitration. The taxpayer is not a party to the arbitration yet 
has a significant effect on the parties. 
 
The taxpayer can refuse the award and render it nugatory.235 This is contradictory to the 
fundamental basis that the parties to arbitration have complete autonomy, it is designed to 
be a private mechanisms for dispute settlement but a third party has the ultimate decision 
as to whether the award is effectual.  
 
D Conclusion 
Three fundamental features of arbitration can be derived from literature and arbitral 
practice: the award is binding, arbitration is an alternative to national courts and the parties 
to the arbitration have complete autonomy. The OECD model of arbitration fails however, 
on all three accounts.  
 
VII Where to from here? 
The current incarnation of arbitration in the MDTC may not represent the irreducible 
elements of arbitration but that does not mean it is a complete failure. The introduction of 
arbitration into the MDTC has been a significant step forward in creating a more stable and 
informative regime of international tax law. There remain however, significant areas for 
improvement. This is not a criticism of the OECD’s attempt; in any nascent proposal there 
will be room for improvement. What is needed, to provide an adequate arbitration 
provision, is a sui generis arbitral regime specific to the intricacies of international tax 
issues. An arbitration system which provides the core of arbitral practice but is also refined 
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to deal with the intricacies of competing sovereign claims and the desire to facilitate 
economic development. In this part of the paper I will attempt to define the improvements 
that can be made to the MDTC. 
 
A Institutional Arbitration  
The first of the recommendations is the provision of a specialised tax arbitration institution. 
An arbitral institution is a focussed body which can facilitate arbitration with a particular 
set of procedural rules, location and professional staff particular to the subject matter of the 
dispute.236 It has been long recognised that institutional arbitration can provide many 
benefits over ad hoc arbitration tribunals which can be unpredictable.237 Much like the 
permanently established arbitration courts that exists today—for the likes of sport,238 
maritime law,239 the grain and feed trade,240 and the metal industry241—tax arbitration is 
well positioned to form an institutional body.  
 
As was mentioned earlier, most DTAs are based on the MDTC,242 therefore most disputes 
will be centred on similar, if not identical provision. The parties can be confident that the 
arbitrators, and the institution that is selected to hear the dispute, have a full understanding 
of the intricacies of the standard form DTA meaning disputes can be rectified in an orderly 
and timely manner.243 This may further increase the legitimacy of the arbitral awards and 
as a result they may be more persuasive than ad hoc arbitral awards. Institutional arbitration 
does not require the formation of an entirely new and innovative arbitral organisation. 
Rather the institutional tax arbitration can be a tailored arbitration under the auspices of an 
existing body like the PCA.  
 
Issues such as compétence-compétence may also arise with the proliferation of arbitration 
in DTAs. States have shown a weariness to the introduction of arbitration in tax. An 
  
236  Born, above n 115, at 27. 
237  Born, above n 178, at 66; and V S Deshpande “How International Arbitration can always Prevail 
over Litigation” (1987) 4 Journal of International Arbitration 9 at 12. 
238  The Court of Arbitration for Sport (Tribunal arbitral du sport). 
239  German Maritime Arbitration Association; Maritime Arbitration Association of the United States; 
and Tokyo Maritime Arbitration Association. 
240  Grain and Feed Trade Association (GAFTA) Arbitration. 
241  London Metal Exchange (LME) Arbitration. 
242  Christians, above n 6 at 15; Rosenbloom and others, above n 6, at 61; and Thuronyi, above n 6, at 
1641. 
243  Mustill, above n 116, at 50. 
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institutional tribunal with experienced arbitrators may be better suited to decide on these 
issues compared to ad hoc arbitrators.244 The expansion of DTAs has also meant that less 
developed countries are more frequently becoming engaged in these types of treaties. As a 
result the dispute resolution processes may be slowed because less developed nations do 
not have the same experience as their more developed counterparts.  
 
Institutionalised arbitration can remedy this experience imbalance.245 Institutional 
arbitration also allows for the mechanics of arbitration to be settled in advance rather than 
through negotiation, which is currently the case. This can significantly reduce the cost of 
arbitration. The selection of arbitrators, their fees and support staff will also be more easily 
managed with institutional arbitration compared to ad hoc arbitration.246 The risk of 
procedural breakdown is reduced considerably with an experienced staff and arbitrators 
available to guide the parties through arbitration.247 This extra support is vital when one of 
the issues of prolonging the settlement of disputes is the parties themselves. This is one of 
the reasons why the vast majority of international arbitration practitioners prefer 
institutional arbitration.248  
 
Over time these institutional arbitration awards can guide and inform MAP negotiations, 
educating taxpayers and competent authorities alike of the potential resolution.249  This is 
crucial to developing a uniform international tax law, rather than a system which is subject 
to horse trading and siloed decisions of the individual and ad hoc arbitrations. This is a 
significant concern of those advocating for some sort of multilateral treaty for tax 
matters.250 While not within the scope of this paper it should be noted that an 
institutionalised arbitration structure, combined with the fact that most bilateral treaties are 
based on the MDTC, would allow for coherent and more uniform interpretation of 
treaties—in essence achieving many of the benefits that a multilateral treaty would 
provide.251 
 
  
244  Born, above n 115, at 66. 
245  Schutze, above n 178, at 72; and Mustill, above n 116, at 54. 
246  Born, above n 115, at 66. 
247  Born, above n 115, at 66. 
248  Born, above n 115, at 67. 
249  Schutze, above n 178, at 71. 
250  See Thuronyi, above n 6, ay 1641; and Rosenbloom and others, above n 6, at 57. 
251  Park, above n 66, at 808. 
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B Clear Arbitral Process 
Currently the OECD provides for the mechanics of the arbitration procedure, such as the 
appointment of arbitrators to be decided by the states.252 It is understood that New 
Zealand’s competent authority has finalised arbitration protocols with the two states New 
Zealand has arbitration provisions (Australia and Japan).253 These agreements remain 
confidential and requests to view these have been denied. The confidentiality of the arbitral 
process may significantly reduce the attractiveness of arbitration to taxpayers. Rather than 
arbitration increasing confidence for taxpayers, the confidentiality has added another layer 
of uncertainty and doubt. 
 
1 Taxpayer involvement 
It is likely that the taxpayer will be excluded from arbitration. The taxpayer is however, a 
primary stakeholder in the arbitration, so to exclude the taxpayer seems to be unreasonable 
and defeat the purpose of DTAs generally.254 DTAs were designed to allocate taxing rights 
so as to avoid double taxation, and facilitate economic growth. In order to best achieve this 
outcome the taxpayer should be involved.255  
 
It is understood that the IRD and the competent authority will continue to consult with 
taxpayers during the arbitration process, as they do during MAP. Furthermore, often the 
position of one competent authority will consistent with the position of the taxpayer. Take 
the situation initially described; a New Zealand tax resident travels to the US to produce 
and record music for an album and earns $10,000 for doing so. The taxpayer might declare 
this on their New Zealand tax return as income for services provided to the music industry 
while not declaring it in the US due to the DTA in place between the two states. Therefore, 
the taxpayer’s position would be that the $10,000 payment was income and subject only to 
New Zealand taxation. This, more likely than not, would be the same position that New 
Zealand would take, in order to retain its tax base. The US however, would claim that it is 
royalties to secure the 5 per cent tax. 
 
This however, does not entirely mitigate the need for taxpayer involvement. While the 
approach of the competent authority may, in essence, represent the taxpayer’s views it 
  
252  OECD Model Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital 2014, art 25(5). 
253  Double Taxation Relief (Australia) Order 2010, schedule one, art 25; and Double Tax Agreements 
(Japan) Order 2013, schedule one, art 26. 
254  Fuller and Bassett, above n 152, at 16. 
255  Nowland, above n 165, at 191. 
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cannot always be guaranteed that that will be the case. In more complex disputes, such as 
transfer pricing, the views of the taxpayer may not be represented effectively. Furthermore, 
if the tribunal raises questions about the facts, the competent authorities may not be able to 
answer them. This may cause undue delays while the information was obtained from the 
taxpayer, further reducing the attractiveness of arbitration.256 The taxpayer should have the 
right to be a party to the arbitration.257 
 
2 Restricting the use of baseball arbitration 
Not only is it imperative that the arbitral process is clear and set out in advance but the 
method of arbitration must also be the most conducive to creating certainty and in turn 
confidence.  As explained above, baseball arbitration is a process where each party submits 
to the arbitral tribunal their last best offer that they would have been willing to accept.258 
The tribunal then simply selects one of the offer and notifies the parties of the offer so 
selected. There is no requirement for a legally robust reasoned decision,259 rather this type 
of arbitration is based on the idea that each party will rationalise their interpretation of the 
treaty for fear that the more extreme the interpretation the less likely the arbitrators are to 
select that offer.260   
 
While baseball arbitration has been effective at getting timely solutions it does nothing to 
address the larger problem that exists within international tax law—the lack of consensus 
and open decision-making. What baseball arbitration does is continue to exacerbate the 
vacuum in which international tax law exists by developing a series of incoherent, 
irreconcilable, and unreasoned arbitral decisions. It is understood that the New Zealand’s 
competent authority has agreed upon baseball arbitration in its arbitral agreements with 
Japan and Australia, this is disappointing. 
 
C Publication of Awards 
Institutionalised arbitration cannot alone create a coherent body of international tax law for 
“an arbitration tribunal cannot follow a previously issued arbitration decision without 
knowing of it”.261 Objectors to the publication of arbitral awards adhere to a traditional 
  
256  Fuller and Bassett, above n 152, at 16. 
257  See generally Nowland, above n 165.  
258  Ault, above n 153, at 149. 
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concept of confidentiality in arbitration.262 As discussed above however, it is now a widely 
recognised concept that when a state is party to the arbitration the right of the public to 
hold the exercise of public power to account must prevail over the confidentiality of the 
arbitral proceedings.263 Furthermore, the OECD has acknowledged, though admittedly in 
a weak fashion, that they contemplate awards being published, stating “publishing the 
decisions would lend additional transparency to the process”.264 
 
Publication of the arbitral awards is desirable and would benefit international tax law in 
three clear ways: a) it would reduce reliance on commentary which tends to be theoretical 
and expressed in general terms and b) it would create clearer expectations for the taxpayer 
and c) it would create a more coherent system of decisions.265 The influence of institutional 
agreement in the area of international tax law has been discussed at length above. While it 
allows states to compromise and agree to the taxation of international activities, there is a 
significant reduction in clarity when disputes arise. While individual taxpayers may benefit 
from negotiated MAP settlements, society as a while may question whether it too benefits 
from these settlements.266 Publication of how governments impose tax obligations upon 
their taxpayers has been characterised as a matter of fairness to taxpayers as a whole.267 
 
The publication of awards would enable a movement away from the disparate solutions to 
double taxation. Publication of awards may encourage the use of prior arbitral decisions as 
authority and provide a cohesive international tax regime.  The risk of fragmentation and 
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varying interpretations of essentially the same DTA would be reduced.268 This idea of loose 
precedent has already been incorporated into other areas of international arbitration.269  
 
Publication of awards may also result in fewer taxpayer objections and provide clearer 
guidance to competent authorities. The disputes which are pursued by taxpayers will not 
all be unique. Often they will not have a unique treaty provision, as majority of DTAs in 
force are based on a single document.270 The publication of arbitral awards will facilitate 
greater settlement of disputes during the MAP process. 
 
Each competent authority would be aware of the interpretation of similar DTAs and what 
arguments a tribunal has previously found persuasive. Some authors have suggested that 
this precedential value of the arbitral awards is something to be avoided.271 This overlooks 
one of the main drivers for inclusion of arbitration in international tax law, which is to 
reduce uncertainty. Uncertainty is a significant cost of doing business and in order to reduce 
this and facilitate economic growth, states need to make outcomes more certain or 
predictable. Moreover, the effect of having vastly different decisions in different 
arbitrations would have the effect of creating distinct silos and legal regimes. The tax laws 
which apply to individuals would differ depending on their circumstances and the success 
or not of the competent authority pitching an acceptable offer in MAP negotiations. This 
is an incoherent way of deciding tax policy, which not only undermine economic 
confidence but also the rule of law.272 
 
D Binding Arbitration 
The arbitral award should be binding on the taxpayer and competent authorities alike.273 
This proposition requires two principles to be recognised. The first is not limiting the scope 
of arbitration to fact only. The second is a modified concept of res judicata or waiver. 
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1 Scope of the arbitration 
The scope of the arbitration must be wide enough to encompass all unresolved matters and 
not restricted to issues of fact. As explained above, restricting the arbitration to issues of 
fact creates something akin to a commission of inquiry releasing an advisory opinion and 
not an arbitral tribunal. In order to be most effective the arbitral tribunal’s competence 
should not be limited. While states will ultimately have the final say on what the arbitral 
tribunal is required to decide, encouraging states to widen the scope of arbitration may help 
to create a more coherent practice and interpretation of DTAs internationally. 
 
2 Res judicata 
The MDTC requires the taxpayer to select a course of action in the first instance; whether 
they would like to pursue the MAP process and arbitration or domestic legal remedies to 
resolve the double taxation. If a taxpayer elects to resolve the issue of double taxation in 
the domestic courts, the taxpayer cannot then have recourse to MAP or arbitration.  This 
does not apply to the inverse situation however. If a taxpayer chooses to proceed to MAP 
and arbitration, and an unpalatable award is delivered, the taxpayer may refuse the award 
and engage domestic remedies.  It is suggested that this is unsatisfactory. A taxpayer should 
not have recourse to domestic courts once there has been an arbitral decision in their 
particular case. In essence the doctrine of res judicata should apply with respect to the 
arbitral decision and bind both the competent authorities and the taxpayer alike. 
 
The doctrine of res judicata is widely accepted as a general principle of international law.274 
While there may be slight variations to the general expression of the doctrine;275 the essence 
of res judicata is that “once adjudicated, a claim cannot be raised again”.276 The res judicata 
triple identity test prevents re-litigation of claims. The three factors are a) the same parties, 
b) the same subject matter, and c) the same cause.277 Res judicata has both positive and 
negative effects.278 The positive effect is that once a decision has been made by a court or 
a tribunal it becomes final and binding on all parties. The negative effect is that the subject 
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of the dispute cannot be re-litigated by the same parties in a later forum.279 The principle 
of res judicata is essential element to produce efficient tax arbitration.280 The award “must 
bind taxpayer and fiscal authorities alike”.281 
 
When applied strictly however, the doctrine may be of no effect in the MDTC. This is 
because the parties to the dispute are not identical. The parties to arbitration are the two 
contracting states while the parties to the domestic court action would be the Revenue 
Department of one state and the taxpayer. Furthermore, the cause of action in arbitration is 
a breach of the DTA, while the cause of action in domestic proceedings is a breach of the 
domestic law. For this reasons recourse must be made to other instruments to prevent 
contradictory decisions from eventuating. International commercial arbitration has 
developed a similar principle to res judicata which may be helpful in this context: waiver.  
 
3 Waiver 
International investment arbitration has developed the concept of waiver to prevent the 
possibility of contradictory decisions from domestic courts and international arbitrations. 
Commercial arbitration requires an election at the time of the initial proceedings, whether 
the investor will pursue domestic or international remedies, as a method to limit an 
investor’s claims to a single forum.282 Applied in the context of the MDTC the taxpayer 
will either select domestic or international remedies at two points. When the case is initially 
brought by the taxpayer to the competent authority, and after two years of MAP 
negotiations.283 
 
This still requires the cause and subject matter to be the same. Taxation not in accordance 
with the DTA, whether on the international or domestic plane. This waiver or election is 
similar to res judicata in that it restricts the taxpayer to either arbitration or domestic 
remedies. Without waiver tax arbitration cannot be seen as anything more than an extended 
“foreplay to future litigation”.284 
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4 Deference 
Concerns have been raised by some tax professionals about taxpayers not having recourse 
to domestic courts after arbitration when the DTA is a domestic tax obligation. These 
concerns can be mitigated to a large degree by reflecting on the approach that the courts 
will take to the arbitral awards in any event.  
 
Domestic courts are likely to show a significant amount of deference to a decision of a 
properly constituted and reasoned arbitral award.285 This deference should not be seen as a 
refusal for an independent decision on the issue, rather it is a recognition of the process 
which has resulted in the award. An arbitration tribunal will often be a specialised tribunal, 
constituted by the parties themselves with the arbitrators selected because of their expertise. 
A court would be right to take into account this expert opinion when delivering its judgment 
and would be unlikely to depart from it. 
 
The possibility of greater deference is further increased if the other proposals I have 
suggested are accepted, namely taxpayer involvement. If the taxpayer has the right to be 
heard and present their case to the arbitral tribunal, a court is likely to show further 
deference to the tribunal. The courts are likely to be unwilling to allow a taxpayer to 
continue to litigate until they receive a decision that is in their favour. The courts have 
shown a great willingness in the past to uphold the spirit of DTAs including assessing what 
view a foreign competent authority would take when making its own judgment.286 
Therefore recourse to domestic courts may not achieve anything other than drawing out the 
proceedings. It is suggested that waiver is not only essential to create an effective 
arbitration scheme but it is desirable.  
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Courts and Arbitrators” (1997) 8 Am Rev Intl Arb 133; Stephan W Schill “Deference in Investment 
Treaty Arbitration: Reconceptualizing the Standard of Review through Comparative Public Law” 
(paper presented to the Third Biennial Global Conference, Singapore, July 2012); and Anthea 
Robertsand and Christina Trahanas “Judicial Review of Investment Treaty Awards: BG Group v 
Argentina” (2014) AJIL 108 750. 
286  See for example Commissioner of Inland Revenue v JFP Energy Inc [1990] 3 NZLR 536 at 542; 
Knights of Columbus v R 2008 TCC 307 at [3]; and American Income Life Insurance Company v 
Canada 2008 TCC 306 at [83]. 
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E Annulment Mechanism 
The finality of awards is an important element of arbitration and one that helps attract 
parties away from litigation.287 However, it is recognised that without some control 
mechanisms there is potential for “wild card” awards to undermine the arbitration 
process.288 The MDTC does not expressly provide an annulment procedure. Though one 
could interpret the taxpayer rejection as a primitive form of annulment mechanism.  
 
The ultimate goal of an annulment mechanism is not to re-adjudicate the award but rather 
to correct procedurally defunct awards.289 It should be noted that there is a distinct 
difference between appeal and annulment. While appeal may deal with substantive 
correctness of the award, annulment is concerned only with procedural legitimacy.290  
 
There are a range of annulment mechanisms used in international arbitration. In 
international commercial arbitration there are three central and competing regimes: a) 
appeals to the judicial authority of the state asked to enforce the award, b) a self-contained 
system that allows for an extraordinary challenge procedure, and c) review at the seat of 
the arbitration. Inter-state arbitration is traditionally limited to review by the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) or a special review panel constituted by the PCA. This part of the 
paper will assess the validity of three annulment mechanisms which may be included in 
the MDTC. 
 
1 Enforcement state assessment 
One of the most widely accepted annulment procedures is that contained in the New York 
Convention.291 The New York Convention allows the judicial authorities of enforcement 
states to inquire into the award’s validity. While traditionally used for commercial 
arbitration as it is limited to commercial matters, some commentators have suggested that 
the Convention may apply to inter-state arbitration where there are “commercial or 
financial disputes”—which could include DTAs.292 Regardless of whether the Convention 
is applicable the substance of the annulment procedure could be incorporated into the 
  
287  Born, above n 115, at 1047; and Christoph Schreuer “Form ICSID Annulment to Appeal: Half Way 
Down the Slippery Slope” (2011) 10 Law Prac Intl Cts Tribunals 211. 
288  Park, above n 66, at 805; and Schreuer, above n 287, at 211. 
289  Park, above n 66, at 805. 
290  Schreuer, above n 287, at 212. 
291  Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 330 UNTS 38 (opened 
for signature 10 June 1958, entered into force 07 June 1959). 
292  Born, above n 178, at 42; and Park, above n 66, at 841. 
50 YOU CAN’T ALWAYS GET WHAT YOU WANT: 
 Analysing the effectiveness of the OECD’s arbitration protocol in the Model Double Tax Convention 
MDTC. Awards can be annulled on the basis that the awards were procedurally flawed or 
against public policy.293 An assessment of substantive correctness of the award is 
prohibited. 
 
The nature of taxation disputes could lead to an overuse of the public interest annulment 
procedure. The tax revenue of a state is inherently connected with public policy. There is 
no doubt that awards impacting tax policy and revenue are “likely to implicate and possibly 
violate one or more of the numerous expressions of public policy embodied in the growing 
myriad of statutes, regulations, and common law doctrines”.294 The ambiguous concept of 
public interest may invite increased intervention.295  
 
Furthermore, when a review of an award is conducted by domestic courts it brings into 
stark focus the underlying tension between domestic courts and international tribunals.296 
Domestic courts must be careful not to exercise excessive control over the arbitral 
proceedings and risk the advantages of arbitration being undermined.297 This is especially 
so in the context of inter-state arbitration as the arbitration should be completely 
“delocalised” from domestic judicial systems to protect its integrity.298 Therefore, this type 
of annulment mechanism may not be desirable for inclusion in the MDTC. 
 
2 Review by a third party 
Annulment procedures may also be facilitated by the ICJ or the PCA.299 The ICJ will likely 
not hear an application for annulment from a taxpayer however, as ICJ jurisdiction only 
extends to cases brought by states.300 The PCA does however, have a procedure where only 
one party is a state and could facilitate a challenge to the arbitration.301 This is premised on 
the proposition that the taxpayer would be a party to the arbitration and could therefore 
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request annulment. If the taxpayer is not a party, then the taxpayer would rely on a state 
“sponsor” for the request.302 
 
3 Self-contained extraordinary challenge procedure 
The International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) provides for 
an internal, self-contained extraordinary challenge to awards.303 Some commentators have 
indicated that an ICSID approach is not practical in tax arbitration because of the 
insufficient resources and will of states to set up a second arbitral tribunal.304 In the absence 
of a second arbitral tribunal such challenges are likely to be facilitated by domestic courts 
as described above. Concerns about cost and state will are mitigated to a large extent by 
the introduction of an institutional body. The institution would be able to facilitate the 
annulment body and may be housed within the OECD, the PCA, or a separate standalone 
body to consider challenges. This option may be the preferred option to avoid the concerns 
identified above with enforcement state and third party annulment. 
 
Facilitation of an annulment of an award is a necessary requirement to encourage state and 
taxpayers to recognise the final and binding nature of the award. The annulment procedure 
may assist in mitigating the sovereignty concerns of states as “wild card” awards can be 
corrected. The taxpayer may also rest assured that any extraordinary failings of the tribunal 
can be mitigated and their tax obligations corrected. It is anticipated however, that 
annulment will continue to be “an unusual result”.305 
 
F The New Arbitral Procedure 
If is helpful to review the procedure that has been proposed in this paper.306 Once the 
taxpayer is aware that they have been subject to taxation not in accordance with the DTA 
they have an option to either commence domestic proceedings or engage in the MAP 
process. In reality, the taxpayer will often do both, however, they will suspend the domestic 
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remedies while the MAP process is ongoing. If domestic remedies are not suspended and 
a judgment is given, MAP will no longer be available. 
 
If the MAP process is pursued this will continue for two years. After two years of MAP 
negotiations the taxpayer will face another election. The taxpayer has the choice to either 
proceed to arbitration or re-engage domestic court proceedings. This selection will waive 
any entitlement that the taxpayer has to alternative remedies. For instance, if the taxpayer 
selects to proceed to arbitration they will not have recourse to domestic litigation and vice 
versa. Because of this waiver, arbitration will remain within the sole discretion of the 
taxpayer. The competent authorities should not be able to bind the taxpayer to arbitration 
and waive their entitlement to domestic remedies. 
 
VIII Conclusion 
Every sovereign state has the inherent right to impose taxes in accordance with its own 
laws.307 Taxation is one of the ways states can benefit from the effects of continued 
economic development. The collision between economic activity and national interest 
however, can impose the burden of double taxation upon taxpayers as each state competes 
to secure a portion of the benefit. As a result of the negative effects caused by double 
taxation, states began agree on taxing rights.308 For the most part, these agreements are now 
in the form of DTAs based on the MDTC. They are designed to encourage economic 
activity within the borders of each state while at the same time prescribing the entitlements 
of each state to tax revenue. The competing interests of states however, can still raise issues 
of interpretation and threaten to thwart the purpose of DTAs.  
 
The differences of interpretation and application have increased the spotlight on DTA 
dispute resolution clauses. The latest move by the OECD has been to include a provision 
for arbitration.309 While arbitration has long been included in a number of international 
business and economic treaties,310 its inclusion in tax treaties came late. The OECD 
proposal has fallen short of expectations. While any nascent proposal will be subject to 
  
307  See generally Jean Bodin Six Books of the Commonwealth (Balckwell, 1576); Dicey, above n 272; 
Adam Tomkins Public Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003); Thuronyi, above n 6, at 1646; 
and Rosenbloom, above n 153. 
308  Irish, above n 3, at 132. 
309  OECD Model Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital 2014, art 25(5). 
310  See for example The Energy Charter Treaty 2008 UNTS 95 (opened for signature 17 December 
1994, entered into force 16 April 1998), art 26; and United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea 1833 UNTS 397 (opened for signature 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 
1944), art 188. 
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possible improvements the decision making process in the OECD has diluted the arbitration 
provision to the extent where it cannot seriously be considered arbitration. 
 
The MDTC model of arbitration does not result in binding decisions. The taxpayer, who is 
not a party to the proceedings, may decline the award and subject competent authorities to 
domestic litigation or continued MAP negotiations. Furthermore, the taxpayer, a centrally 
affected party, has no input. The arbitral procedure is not a true alternative to domestic 
courts. Arbitration has proven to be an effective dispute resolution mechanism at 
international law. With the adoption of the recommendations made in this paper the 
arbitration clause in the MDTC can develop into an effective and efficient regime for 
resolving tax disputes. A regime that caters for the intricacies of competing sovereign 
claims while continuing to encourage economic development.  
 
 
 
Word Count: The text of this paper (excluding the cover page, contents page, footnotes, 
appendices and bibliography) consists of exactly 14,684 words.  
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IX Appendix One 
OECD MDTC 
ARTICLE 25 
MUTUAL AGREEMENT PROCEDURE 
1. Where a person considers that the actions of one or both of the Contracting States 
result or will result for him in taxation not in accordance with the provisions of this 
Convention, he may, irrespective of the remedies provided by the domestic law of 
those States, present his case to the competent authority of the Contracting State of 
which he is a resident or, if his case comes under paragraph 1 of Article 24, to that 
of the Contracting State of which he is a national. The case must be presented within 
three years from the first notification of the action resulting in taxation not in 
accordance with the provisions of the Convention. 
 
2. The competent authority shall endeavour, if the objection appears to it to be justified 
and if it is not itself able to arrive at a satisfactory solution, to resolve the case by 
mutual agreement with the competent authority of the other Contracting State, with 
a view to the avoidance of taxation which is not in accordance with the Convention. 
Any agreement reached shall be implemented notwithstanding any time limits in 
the domestic law of the Contracting States. 
 
3. The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall endeavour to resolve by 
mutual agreement any difficulties or doubts arising as to the interpretation or 
application of the Convention. They may also consult together for the elimination 
of double taxation in cases not provided for in the Convention. 
 
4. The competent authorities of the Contracting States may communicate with each 
other directly, including through a joint commission consisting of themselves or 
their representatives, for the purpose of reaching an agreement in the sense of the 
preceding paragraphs. 
 
5. Where, 
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a. under paragraph 1, a person has presented a case to the competent authority 
of a Contracting State on the basis that the actions of one or both of the 
Contracting States have resulted for that person in taxation not in 
accordance with the provisions of this Convention, and 
b. the competent authorities are unable to reach an agreement to resolve that 
case pursuant to paragraph 2 within two years from the presentation of the 
case to the competent authority of the other Contracting State, 
 
any unresolved issues arising from the case shall be submitted to arbitration if the 
person so requests. These unresolved issues shall not, however, be submitted to 
arbitration if a decision on these issues has already been rendered by a court or 
administrative tribunal of either State. Unless a person directly affected by the case 
does not accept the mutual agreement that implements the arbitration decision, that 
decision shall be binding on both Contracting States and shall be implemented 
notwithstanding any time limits in the domestic laws of these States. The competent 
authorities of the Contracting States shall by mutual agreement settle the mode of 
application of this paragraph.311 
  
  
311  In some States, national law, policy or administrative considerations may not allow or justify the 
type of dispute resolution envisaged under this paragraph. In addition, some States may only wish 
to include this paragraph in treaties with certain States. For these reasons, the paragraph should only 
be included in the Convention where each State concludes that it would be appropriate to do so 
based on the factors described in paragraph 65 of the Commentary on the paragraph. As mentioned 
in paragraph 74 of that Commentary, however, other States may be able to agree to remove from the 
paragraph the condition that issues may not be submitted to arbitration if a decision on these issues 
has already been rendered by one of their courts or administrative tribunals. 
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X Appendix Two 
A Proposed New Dispute Resolution Process 
 
  
Taxation not in accordance with the DTA 
Domestic Court Remedies MAP Negotiations 
Two Years of MAP Negotiations 
Arbitration Domestic Court Remedies 
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